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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three empirical papers on various topics, which are brought together under
a broad umbrella of Applied Public Economics.
The first paper "Illicit Drug Seizures and Drug Consumption: Evidence from Italy" aims at uncov-
ering causal links between cocaine seizures and cocaine-related hospital admissions by resorting to
instrumental variables approach, using data on Italian provinces. Additionally, the study explores
spatial interrelations between the variables of interest by adopting the SLX model. According to
the results obtained, ignoring endogeneity leads to underestimating the effect of seizures on con-
sumption by biasing the coefficient towards zero. Spatial relations were also found to be significant
between seizures in key entry points and consumption in the rest of the country, as well as between
seizures in adjacent provinces and consumption in a home province.
The second paper "Baby Bonuses and Household Consumption: Evidence from Russia" exploits
a fertility-incentivizing reform that took place in Russia in 2007 to study the responses of eligible
households in terms of consumption expenditure patterns. The peculiar design of the reform al-
lows treating becoming eligible for the assistance as a positive wealth shock; therefore, the main
focus of the paper is testing several theoretical predictions of the "wealth shocks" literature in a
setting of a developing country. The results indicate the presence of liquidity constraints, as well
as households resorting to consuming from wealth to smoothen consumption trajectories.
The third paper investigates causal links between problem drinking and depression by adopting
a bivariate correlated random effects probit model, using individual-level data from the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). According to the results, there is evidence of bidirec-
tional causality between the two variables, although there are significant differences along the
gender dimension: the impact of depression on alcohol abuse is present only in the female sub-
population. In addition, state dependence of alcohol abuse is higher among males. The study also
provides estimates of potential effects of alcohol prices doubling on both depression and alcohol
abuse: although a policy tackling problem drinking would be relatively more effective in reducing
also depression in the males subpopulation, male alcohol abusers are found to be price-insensitive,
whereas depression prevalence among females would decrease as a result of higher alcohol prices
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This dissertation consists of three independent empirical papers in the field of applied public eco-
nomics, with a particular focus on public health.
The choice of topics is motivated by several pressing issues of the modern society, on both global
and local scales. Among such issues are illicit drug consumption and drug policies. Drug con-
sumption is a worldwide concern that spares neither developed nor developing countries: while
the former are typically the major consumers, the latter are the main production sites. In ad-
dition to negative health impacts, marginalization of addicted individuals and adverse effects on
consumers’ labour market outcomes and general well-being, high demand in the First World is
fueling poverty, criminal activity and corruption in the source countries. An important step to
challenge these interconnected issues on a global scale was made with the appearance in 1997 of the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which is the leading unit in discussion, development
and implementation of various drug policies on global and local levels. Although the problem is
extremely relevant, there are substantial difficulties in properly assessing and predicting the effects
of various anti-drug policies: typical issues of determining the causal effects and assessing external
validity are aggravated by low data availability and quality, especially on disaggregated scale, due
to the criminal nature of drug production and distribution. Attempting to overcome these difficul-
ties to the extent possible, the first chapter investigates the impact of illicit drug seizures on drug
consumption, in particular, for the provincial cocaine markets in Italy, providing the first evidence
of a negative impact of confiscations on cocaine consumption. Incorporating spatial interrelations
between provinces allows to capture significant interconnectedness among geospatial units: the
results shed light on how cocaine seizures in key entry points affect consumption in the rest of
the country, as well as on the impact of seizures in adjacent provinces on consumption in a home
province. We hope that these findings could be of interest for policy-makers in taking decisions on
funding enforcement activities, as well as for local forces in determining geographic allocation of
law enforcement units.
A peculiar feature of the second chapter is that it relates to theoretical life-cycle literature, testing
several predictions of wealth shocks impacts on current consumption. A distinct characteristic of
the approach adopted is studying a positive wealth shock of microeconomic nature in a transition
country (Russian) context: becoming eligible to a lump-sum non-cash assistance worth $10.000
with the birth of a second or higher order child. This assistance is a fertility incentivizing measure
that came to action in Russia since 2007 and spurred a lot of public debate, as well as research
aiming to estimate the effects of this policy on fertility and female employment. As opposed to
this pool of studies, the analysis conducted in the second chapter suggests taking a different per-
spective by treating becoming eligible to the assistance as a positive wealth shock, in particular,
a shock to the housing wealth, since the majority of eligible families choose to use these funds
to improve housing conditions. According to the results, on average, households do not react to
this wealth shock by increasing consumption, but more borrowing constrained households with
low levels of wealth (tenants) do, which is in line with previous wealth effects literature. In ad-
dition, it appears that several policy changes, which allowed immediate utilization of the grant
if a household was taking a mortgage, do not stimulate faster use of funds and their conversion
into housing wealth. This finding may suggest that improving mortgage markets and increasing
the level of trust in financial system can result in the households’ higher propensity to convert
the assistance into housing value. Finally, the study touches the issue of inequality, which is a
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huge concern for Russia and many other countries: it emerges that the policy has contributed
to reducing housing wealth inequality; however, a vital question to be addressed in the future
research is whether this decrease in wealth inequality will not be accompanied by a future increase
in human capital inequality, since wealthier eligible households would opt for investing the funds
into children’s education.
The third chapter takes the reader back to the field of public health, this time with a focus
on establishing causal links between alcohol abuse and depression, again in the Russian context.
In the light of increasing prevalence of various types of mental disorders (the prevalence growth is
especially fast in developing and transition countries), their high comorbidity, lengthy and costly
treatment, and adverse impacts on physical health, productivity and numerous other outcomes,
pinning down causal effects they have on each other becomes a relevant policy issue: having a
proper estimate of the impacts, it will be possible to predict how effective a certain policy tackling
one disorder would be in decreasing also the prevalence of the other. To reach the goal of capturing
bidirectional causal links, a structural model with dynamic cross-spillovers is proposed. Although
the adopted methodology is different from what was done in other studies, especially those in the
fields of social epidemiology and psychiatry, from the qualitative perspective the results are quite
in line with existing evidence, suggesting that depression causes alcohol abuse among females,
but not among males, whereas the reverse causal link is significant in both subpopulations. This
implies that for the male subpopulation, treating depression will not lead to a decrease in alcohol
abuse, while a policy reducing alcohol abuse will have a spillover effect reducing the probability
of being depressed. In addition, decreasing problem drinking at a given point in time will be
more effective in reducing future probability of alcohol abuse for males than for females. Taken
together these two facts suggest that an adequate policy able to reduce alcohol abuse has a good
chance to diminish both problem drinking and depression for the male subpopulation in the long
run. Therefore, the analysis conducted in the third chapter incorporates alcohol prices into the
model, in order to find out whether taxation and other pricing policies can be effective from this
perspective. However, according to the results, male alcohol abusers are price-insensitive; this last
finding urges for measures other than price increases to be developed and adopted in the Russian
environment in order to reduce hazardous drinking among males.
One of the most vital issues on the frontline of empirical research is addressing endogeneity and
identifying causal links. Almost all processes that take place in the course of societal develop-
ment and even more so individual choices are affected by such a large number of factors that
applied work on virtually any topic has to solve the endogeneity problem if it wishes to pin down
causality. These matters are also in the core of this dissertation, and a wide variety of tools are
applied to be able to make inference about causal effects, and not just correlations. The empiri-
cal toolkit includes a reduced form instrumental variable approach embedded also into the spatial
modelling framework when studying the impact of illicit drug seizures on drug consumption; a first-
differenced specification to account for heterogeneity in households’ tastes, preferences and other
time-invariant unobserved characteristics when analyzing the response of current consumption to
the wealth shock; and a bivariate nonlinear dynamic structural model with state dependence and
correlated unobserved heterogeneity to investigate the causal links between alcohol abuse and de-
pression.
Therefore, this study, motivated by hilghly relevant real world issues, contributes to the exist-
ing literature by shedding light on several causal interconnections within these topics. For each
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question of interest the appropriate methodological technique is chosen and tailored to the setting
depending on the nature of the phenomenon and data availability. Although any approach has
its limitations, we believe to have obtained a set of novel results and hope that these findings can
not only be of interest for the academic audience, but also yield benefits to decision-makers and








This paper examines the impact of illicit drug seizures on drug consumption, using Italian
province-year panel for the years 2010-2014. Specifically, we focus on cocaine market and aim
to uncover the relationship and the causal effect of cocaine seizures on cocaine consumption
proxied by cocaine-related hospitalization rates. The paper contributes to the existing litera-
ture in several ways. Firstly, we build a new panel dataset that has some favourable features
as opposed to those used in the previous studies. Secondly, unlike the existing literature that
barely touches the endogeneity issue, we address it by resorting to the instrumental variable
estimation, using seaports turnover as an instrument for seizures. Our results suggest that
there is a stable statistically significant negative relationship between cocaine seizures and
cocaine consumption: on average, a one standard deviation increase in a province’s cocaine
seizures rate is associated with a 0.033 standard deviation decrease in related hospitalization
rates; with an instrumental variables approach this effect reaches about 0.093 standard de-
viation. Finally, we also explore spatial interaction between provinces and find a negative
relationship between seizures in key entry points and consumption in the rest of the country,
as well as a negative relationship between seizures in adjacent provinces and consumption in
a home province.
JEL classification: I18, C23, C26.
Keywords: illicit markets, drug consumption, anti-drug policies, fixed effects, endogeneity,
spatial econometrics.
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1 Introduction
Drug consumption has been an important issue all over the world for several decades, not
only because of the obvious adverse health effects, both directly from substance abuse and
concomitant diseases, but also due to being a catalyst for other types of crimes. According
to the United Nations World Drug Report of 2015, the total estimated number of illicit drug
consumers has been growing from 2008 and reached 246 million worldwide in 2013, out of
which 27.4 million were problem drug users.
In tackling the issue, the governments put in practice antidrug policies, which can be divided
into two main directions: supply reduction and demand reduction. While both directions
are generally considered important, in some countries there is a bias towards supply-side re-
duction measures (for instance, in the US the supply-side policies have always prevailed over
the demand-side, occupying a larger share of the Office of National Drug Control Policy bud-
get until recently). The large debate around supply reduction efficiency and the increasing
evidence of its failure to decrease supply and/or adverse side effects (e.g. increase in vio-
lence (Dell, 2015) incentivized the turn to demand reduction, and also contributed to raising
the discussion on decriminalization, depenalization and legalization issues. The evidence is
controversial, and supply-side policies still account for about a half of the budgets in many
countries1. This paper aims to provide another piece of evidence regarding one of the supply-
reduction measures: drug seizures.
According to the general trend, consumption tends to rise together with the amounts seized
(see UNODC et al. (2009)) on a world-wide and even country level. This fact is both intuitive
and counterintuitive at the same time. On one hand, theory would suggest that if seizures
decrease supply, ceteris paribus the amount consumed should also decrease. On the other
hand, if seizures account for a very small share of the drug available in the market (which is
more likely to be true on aggregated levels) then the rise in volumes seized should be viewed
as a signal that the amount of drug available in the market is increasing. Thus, seizures are
commonly perceived as an indicator of market size and not as an effective measure to reduce
drug availability. This project makes an attempt to determine whether drug seizures, under
certain circumstances, could actually be effective as a policy measure to reduce consumption,
and are not only an indicator of the market size.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of related literature and
outlines how this study contributes to what has been done before, followed by Section 3,
which discusses the motivation to use Italian data and to focus specifically on cocaine market,
and Section 4 that motivates the choice of consumption proxy. In Section 5 we provide the
baseline results and outline methodological challenges, which we tackle in Section 6 by propos-
ing different instrumental variable approaches, and explore spatial interactions in Section 7.
We then provide some robustness analysis in Section 6. Finally, Section 9 summarizes the
findings and outlines directions for future research.
2 Literature review
Supply-side policies are very diverse and include crop eradication in producer countries, in-
carceration of drug dealers and players of higher hierarchical level, seizures of drugs on any
1The current study is focused on Italy; according to the 2012 figures, supply-reduction policies account for 43%
of public expendiure related to illicit drugs (EMCDDA, 2012).
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stage of production, seizures of property, transport, cash, sites, forfeiture of any other assets
used for operating drug business, for synthetic drugs - imposing regulations on the main con-
stituents market, etc.
Theoretically, the link between supply disruption and consumption should be prices: if the
policy leads to a substantial shift in the supply curve, ceteris paribus it will lead to an increase
in price and a decrease in the quantity consumed. Most of the existing empirical literature
examines separately the two phases of the process: effect of the enforcement on price, and the
relation between price and consumption. Concerning the price-consumption interconnection,
the research commonly finds a negative relation. Schifano and Corkery (2008) report that
crack cocaine death mentions are negatively correlated with prices. Caulkins (2001), Caulkins
(2007), and Dave (2006) find that cocaine and heroin prices are negatively related to hospital
admissions due to poisoning by cocaine and heroin. Brunt, Van Laar, et al. (2010) study the
Dutch market and also find that lower cocaine prices are associated with higher numbers of
addiction treatment and hospital admissions, whereas for amphetamine only the relation with
addiction treatment was confirmed.
Weatherburn et al. (2003) and Smithson et al. (2004) investigate the effects of heroin short-
age in Australia in late 2000. A large increase of heroin price was observed, while purity
and consumption, measured by hospital admissions for overdoses, decreased as a result of the
shortage. No substantial evidence of an increase in negative outcomes due to heroin users
switching to other drugs was found, but a remarkable increase in methadone treatment pro-
gram enrolments took place.
Other papers exploit the drop in prices due to decriminalization and legalization2. Model
(1993) finds an increase of hospital admissions due to cannabis intoxication and a decrease
of that from other types of drugs as a result of marijuana decriminalization in 12 US states
between 1973 and 1978. M. Anderson et al. (2013) analyze the effect of medical marijuana
legalization on traffic fatalities. They show that legalization was associated with a sharp de-
cline in prices and also a decrease in traffic fatalities, which they attribute to the substitution
effect: consumers moved from alcohol to marijuana and the net effect on traffic fatalities
turned out to be negative. This evidence can be viewed as supportive of the prediction that
illicit drugs consumption is in general negatively related to prices, and also depends on the
quality expectations of consumers.
Most of these studies are analyzing the relation between purity-adjusted prices and health
outcomes. Implementation of the supply-reduction strategies requires the policymaker to
take into account purity. It is well-known that illicit drugs, especially hard drugs, are mixed
with other substances and are never sold in absolutely pure form. If these adulterants ad-
versely affect health outcomes, it could be the case that although per-pure-gram price rises,
the actual price, not adjusted for purity but the one the consumers pay, does not change or
increases only unsubstantially, so that the amount of deals stays the same, but while drug
poisonings due to active substance will decrease, this positive effect might be offset by the in-
creased damage due to adulterants. However, if cutting with poisonous agents was a common
practice, the negative relationship between per-pure-gram prices and drug-related hospital ad-
missions would not be as distinct as it appears from the studies mentioned above. While there
2 There is mixed evidence on whether decriminalization leads to an increase in availability and decrease in prices:
for instanse, Félix and Portugal (2017), analyzing the effect of drug decriminalization in Portugal in 2001 on prices
for opiates and cocaine, find that no price decrease took place.
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is some evidence that adverse substances are sometimes found in the samples (Brunt, Rigter,
et al., 2009), it is important to note that consumers’ demand, especially of non-dependent
users, is sensitive not only to price, but also to quality given the price fixed (J. C. Cole et al.,
2008). Even if consumers cannot observe quality before actually using drugs, the reputation
mechanism plays a big role.
Galenianos et al. (2012) with their search-theoretic model for illicit drugs retail market show
that enforcement, increasing the sellers’ costs, may reinforce long run relationships and will
not lead to a decrease in purity. Rose (2016) builds a theoretical model (as opposed to Gale-
nianos et al. (2012), it allows sellers to choose purity and per-gram-price in each period) and
also empirically assesses the effects of supply disruption on purity and prices. The model
predicts that seizures result in dilution, which, in turn, reduces future demand. GMM esti-
mation of a time-series for Washington DC confirmed that seizures negatively affect purity in
the same period and the price in the future period. Testing the impact on consumption was
not conducted due to absence of reliable consumption data.
Thus, the users could adjust their consumption depending on their quality expectations. Due
to the fact that illicit drugs market is characterized by repeated purchases, reputation mat-
ters, which makes it unlikely for sellers to use adulterating substances that have immediate
severe health effects (Coomber, 2006). This is supported by a review of empirical evidence on
adulterants by C. Cole et al. (2011), according to which critically poisonous substances are
rarely found in drug samples.
Regarding existing literature on the enforcement effect on prices, findings only partially sup-
port theoretical predictions, and results depend on the type of enforcement applied. For
example, according to Kuziemko and Levitt (2004), harsher punishments for drug offenders
are associated with higher drug prices. Dobkin and Nicosia (2009) study the effect of an
exogenous policy change which imposed tough restrictions on distributors of ephedrine, one
of the most common methamphetamine precursors. Analyzing monthly data on price, purity,
related hospital admissions and methamphetamine use by arrestees in California’s counties,
they find that the policy led to the rise of price and a decrease in purity, hospital admissions
and arrestees’ consumption. Following this study, Cunningham and Finlay (2016) investi-
gate the further state and federal interventions into the US precursor market and find that
each subsequent intervention had a weaker effect on the market than the previous one. The
effects on the prices and hospital admissions are significant but temporary. There is also a
range of studies that try to capture the effect of enforcement on consumption without directly
incorporating prices. Chaloupka et al. (1999) argue that sanctions for the possession of co-
caine and marijuana have a negative impact on youth cocaine and marijuana use. On the
contrary, sanctions for the sale, manufacture or distribution of cocaine and marijuana have
little impact on youth consumption of these drugs. Callaghan et al. (2009) study precur-
sor availability restrictions in Canada, in a setting similar to the one in Dobkin and Nicosia
(2009). Having conducted time-series analysis on country-level monthly data, the authors
conclude that, contrary to what was expected, those restrictions were associated with a rise
in methamphetamine-related admissions.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge there is no empirical evidence of a robust negative rela-
tionship between drug seizures and consumption. DiNardo (1993), having constructed a state-
year panel for the US, finds an insignificant positive interrelation between cocaine seizures and
per-pure-gram price, also without any impact on consumption. Yuan and Caulkins (1998)
study a national level monthly time-series and conclude that there is no Granger-causal rela-
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tionship between seizures and cocaine and heroin prices. Similarly Wan et al. (2016) analyzing
drug market in New South Wales, Australia via ARDL model, report generally insignificant
or positive relation between seizures of cocaine, heroin, amphetamine substances and hospital
admissions related to these substances.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, a vast majority of
studies uses the US STRIDE data, which is understandable because this dataset is large and
provides information on price, purity and seizures. Using a different, not previously explored,
dataset could provide new insights. This study is using data on drug seizures and hospital
admissions in Italy to study the effect of supply disruption, measured by seizures, on con-
sumption, proxied by hospital admissions, so the data on prices is not necessary to conduct
the analysis. Some additional advantages and motivations to resort to the Italian case are pro-
vided in the next section. Second, the properties of these data allow overcoming an important
drawback of a large part of the existing literature: aggregation among space and time masks
the existing effects. For instance, Arkes et al. (2008) claims that drug markets are localized
and prices and purity vary substantially among the US cities within the same region. The data
we use allows disaggregation up to provincial level. Having a panel dataset has an obvious
advantage over cross-sections as it makes it possible to observe the units over time and use
internal instruments. Compared to time-series a panel allows for a more accurate inference
of the model parameters (due to higher number of observations), and in our setting makes it
possible to analyze spatial relationships between the variables of interest. This is a reason-
able and necessary extension, since the phenomenon under investigation is clearly spatial by
nature. Finally, unlike the existing literature that barely touches the endogeneity issue, we
address it by resorting to the instrumental variable estimation, using seaports turnover as an
instrument for seizures in the external instruments approach, which is compared with results
yielded by Arellano-Bond and Spatial 2SLS methodologies.
3 Market peculiarities and key characteristics
The motivation to study the case of Italy is driven by several factors. Firstly, the prevalence
of drug use is one of the highest in Italy among other European countries. According to data
provided by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA),
Italy ranks 4th in last year and last month prevalence among all adults aged 15-64, 3rd in
last year prevalence among young adults (15-34) and 2nd in last month prevalence among
young adults (use of any illegal drugs considered). Although the general trend of drug use
is declining, in parallel the alarming tendency of increasing usage among the student popula-
tion (aged 15-19) is observed (according to 2013 Italian National Report to EMCDDA). This
makes drug consumption an important issue from the policy-makers point of view, requiring
substantial budgets3.
Secondly, a peculiar feature is Italy’s geographic position: located at the center of the Mediter-
ranean Sea and possessing a long coastline, Italy is an entry and transit area for the traffickers
delivering drugs to Europe. This characteristic results in considerable quantities seized, which
is necessary to capture the effect on consumption, and, importantly, makes the seizures less
endogenous with respect to the local market features. From the technical point of view, a
big advantage of Italian data is its availability and substantial spatial disaggregation level (up
3According to EMCDDA (2008), for 2008 the social cost of illicit drug use was estimated at EUR 6.5 billion, with
law enforcement activities accounting for the largest share (43%), and the remainder divided between healthcare
and social services (27%) and loss of productivity of drug users and people indirectly affected by drug use (30%).
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to provinces), which is crucial, since the effects of the seizures, if any, are likely to be localized.
Throughout the paper we are focusing on the cocaine market, and this is also not by chance.
Firstly, despite the fact that the prevalence of soft drugs (marijuana and hashish) use is much
higher than that of hard drugs (cocaine and heroin), which makes the use of cannabioids a
relatively more pressing policy issue, for the problem at hand it makes sense to focus on hard
drugs markets, since the demand for hard drugs is more price-elastic. In his review of studies
Gallet (2014) finds that price elasticity is smallest for marijuana, compared to cocaine and
heroin. Although it is plausible that hard drug users are more addicted which should make
their demand inelastic, they are also more experienced and often polydrug users and can find
substitutes rather easily. If the demand is price-inelastic, seizures would have a negligible,
if any, effect on consumption. Another possibility is that even though confiscations of mar-
ijuana and hashish do have an impact on street prices, users might find a way to substitute
by resorting to home-growing, and so consumption will remain unaffected, while for cocaine
and heroin it is not an issue. Secondly, when considering cocaine and heroin, the demand
elasticity might be higher for cocaine, since it is less addictive than heroin, more expensive
and is generally considered as a luxury good. Not surprisingly consumption expenditures on
cocaine accounted for 43% of total 14.2 billion euros spent by Italians on all types of drugs
in 20144. Another reason for focusing on the market for cocaine rather than heroin is the
abovementioned consideration on purity and adulterants/diluents present in the final product
when it reaches the consumer. Although we cannot exclude completely the possibility that
the seller might use harmful substances for dilution, this issue is much less of a concern for
cocaine as compared to heroin. The avreage purity of cocaine is twice as high as that of heroin,
and is around 60%5. Due to the fact that cocaine users are those who provide highest profits,
the reputation mechanism in this market works very well. A series of papers summarizing the
findings of Addiction and Lifestyles in Contemporary Europe: Reframing Addictions Project
(ALICE RAP) provides interesting insights about peculiarities of cocaine and heroin markets
in Italy. Tzvetkova et al. (2014) have inerviewed imprisoned drug dealers in Italy, discussing
how dealers handle risks, customers, competitors, etc. It emerged that dealers prefer cocaine
users to heroin users, because the latter have lower purchasing power, are likely to suffer from
addiction, thus attracting unnecessary law enforcement attention and even willing to cooperate
with them and denounce the dealer for a reward. Cocaine users, in contrast, were described as
wealthy and easy to deal with. Moreover, as revealed by the study, by committing to quality
cocaine dealers aim to maintain a regular pool of trustworthy customers who are ready to pay.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it may be useful to have some indication of whether the
effects we are after are possible to capture, or the local markets are so resilient and flexible6,
that market participants do not change their behaviour and market outcomes are barely af-
fected. The abovementioned study on dealers’ business strategies sheds some light on this
issue.
Dealers do appear to have several suppliers, which makes them more resistant towards supply
disruption and allows adjustment within a short time lapse. However, since commitment to
4Estimation carried out by ISTAT and provided in 2017 Annual Report of Antidrug Policy Department. For a
review of alternative estimates of Italian drug market size see Giommoni (2014).
5According to Annual Reports of Antidrug Policy Department for the years 2010-2014.
6As highlited in the literature, drug market players have the capability to adjust to temporary shocks very
quickly and replace the lost resources (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010).
15
quality generally prevents sellers from cutting the drug below a certain level of purity7, short-
ages, though not long-lasting, do occur. In the periods of lack of supply some dealers would
take a vacation, switch off their phones and leave the city where they operate, others would
ask the customers to wait or refer them to fellow dealers in other locations. One of the inter-
viewees explicitly stated: "If there is a seizure or a police operation, then the amount available
decreases and prices go up". This qualitative evidence suggests that while local markets are
resilient and adaptive, the theoretically predicted effect of law enforcement on prices is indeed
present.
4 Consumption proxy
Due to illicit nature of the phenomenon under consideration, measuring drug consumption
is a challenging task. While a direct measure does not exist, several proxies are commonly
resorted to in the literature depending on the research objective. For a descriptive analysis of
trends, survey data is used most often. However, this proxy is subject to the usual weaknesses
of survey data, which are magnified by the sensitive nature of the issue. The two main surveys
conducted in Italy are the General Population Survey and Student Population Survey where
respondents are asked questions about their substance use habits. These, however, do not
allow for substantial disaggregation and rigorous estimation of the quantity of the substance
consumed. The questions typically asked are "Have you ever used ... ?", "Did you use ... in
the previous month/year?" and "How many times, approximately, did you use ... in the past
month/year?". These types of questions require the respondents to think retrospectively and
fit their replies in the intervals provided for the answer.
A recent tool for measuring community-level drug consumption is wastewater analysis that
in theory can provide daily estimates (though there might be concerns about precision8) of
substances consumed in a given area by examining their residuals present in wastewater. The
main disadvantage of this technique is its high cost, therefore, in practice, the equipment is
installed in selected stations for a short period of time. In Italy, the analysis is conducted
by the Mario Negri Institute in 17 Italian cities9 and provides an estimate for the city-level
consumption in a given year (the wastewater samples are taken during 1 week in a year). How-
ever, having only 17 spatial units in the sample is not sufficient to provide robust inference.
We therefore resort to drug-related hospitalization rates as a proxy for drug consumption.
The main advantages of this measure are objectivity, full coverage in the space dimension
on a sufficiently disaggregated level (we chose provincial partition), and availability on yearly
basis. The main disadvantages are relatively low numbers of hospital admissions (indeed, very
few users are hospitalized, as compared to the total number of consumers) and ambiguity in
relation to purity (if it is the case that diluents are harmful substances per se, seizures may
result in hospitalization rates changing in the opposite direction). Since we are not trying to
estimate the total amount of drug consumed or the total amount of users, which would be
measured well by wastewater analysis and population survey respectively, but rather the con-
7Reputation plays a role at all dealing levels and, in fact, is not the only factor that explains preference for selling
lower volumes of a more pure substance, rather than a cut drug in greater volumes. Important considerations are
need for storage, labor required for repackaging (these are relevant for high quantity dealers) and time involved in
selling, which are higher in the latter case and increase risks of being caught.
8For a critical analysis of sewage epidemiology see Nuijs et al. (2011).
9Refer to Zuccato, Castiglioni, Tettamanti, et al. (2011) and Zuccato and Castiglioni (2012) for the description
of procedure and results, and Zuccato, Castiglioni, Senta, et al. (2016) for comparison of wastewater analysis with
evidence from the abovementioned General Population Survey.
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sumption response to the decrease of supply, the proxy we resort to is appropriate. Regarding
the purity issue, the evidence from chemical analysis and drug dealers interviews suggests
that the use of poisonous cutting agents in response to lack of supply, and even substantial
increase in dilution per se10, is highly unlikely. Thus, we believe that drug-related hospital-
ization rates, though having their own drawbacks, are the best proxy available to answer the
question of interest.
5 Data and analysis
5.1 Data sources, variables and descriptive statistics
As data on cocaine street prices is not available on province-year level for Italy, this study
resorts to the reduced form approach to investigate how cocaine seizures affect the dependent
variable of interest: cocaine consumption.
The data on drug seizures is openly available on the Italian National Police website (poliziadis-
tato.it). The province-level time-series are available from 2008 until the present moment (al-
though there is an issue of data quality in the early and most recent years of collection and so
the data from those years should be considered as provisionary) and contain information on
the volume of seizures in kilograms for heroin, cocaine, marijuana, hashish, cannabis plants
and amphetamines, as well as the number of operations, number of people arrested, released
and not captured, and the number of minors and foreigners out of total number of persons
denounced (the persons reported to the Judicial Authority for drug-related offences). Thus,
the data would allow not only to identify the effect of drug seizures, but also control for the
number of arrests and number of operations, which could be contaminating factors and need
to be accounted for. The main independent variable of interest is seizures rate, which is ex-
pressed in tens of kilograms of cocaine seized in a given year in a given province per 100.000
inhabitants (seizr).
The main indicator for consumption are the most frequently used in the literature drug-
related hospital admissions. Italian Ministry of Health, upon request, provides micro-level
data on hospital admissions and dismissals by ICD-9 diagnosis codes; using these data we
constructed the dependent variable: province-year cocaine-related hospital admission rate
per 100.000 inhabitants (HAr). A range of other important variables is adopted as a set of
province-level baseline controls: per capita income (income), unemployment rate (unemp),
share of foreign residents (foreign), criminal associations crime rate (crmr), and the share of
men aged 35-39 in the population (men3539), as this demographic category is the most prone
to cocaine consumption.
The perfectly balanced province-year panel used in the analysis consists of 5 years (2010-
2014) and 103 units (provinces), which yields 515 observations in total. Table 1 provides
summary statistics for the selected variables.
The spatial distribution of the hospitalization rates and volumes of cocaine seized is depicted
in figures 1 and 2. While there is some overlap between high-consumption and high-seizures
provinces, it is far from a perfect one. This may suggest that simultaneity on the cross-
sectional level is not too extreme in the data at hand. Spatial distribution of other control
variables is presented in subsection A.1 of the Appendix.
10In fact, increased dilution does not invalidate our proxy. If a drug is sold at the same price but is less pure since
the amount of active substance is relatively lower, this should result in a decrease of related hospital admissions.
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Table 1: Summary statistics (2010-2014)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P1 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99
HAr 515 4.04 5.93 0 43.78 0 .32 .91 2.1 4.74 8.95 31.9
seizr 515 .72 3.89 0 47.11 0 0 .01 .06 .18 .57 21.19
income 515 12.96 2.89 7.28 20.25 7.84 8.77 10.01 13.68 15.21 16.11 18.43
unemp 515 10.7 5.22 2.69 27.81 3.73 5.28 6.8 9.15 13.45 18.53 25.66
crmr 515 1.4 2.2 0 31.04 0 .19 .52 .95 1.56 2.5 9.03
foreign 515 .07 .03 .01 .16 .01 .02 .04 .07 .1 .11 .14
men3539 515 .06 .1 0 1.3 0 .01 .02 .04 .07 .13 .45
In columns P1-P99 the corresponding percentiles are reported.
Figure 1: A map of cocaine-related hospitalization rates in provinces
(average for 2010-1014)




We assume that the partial equilibrium in a province market for cocaine is formed by the
interaction of supply and demand, so that when there is a seizure substantial enough to shift
the supply curve, per-pure-gram price rises and quantity consumed decreases11. A reduced-
form equation for the quantity consumed, which we proxy by the rate of cocaine-related
hospital admissions, takes the following form:
HArit = ai + τt + γSit + δXit + εit (1)
Here ai is the province fixed effect, τt is the time (year) fixed effect which is common for all the
provinces, Sit is the amount of drug seized in province i in year t per unit of population, Xit
is a set of controls, and εit is the idiosyncratic disturbance. Our main coefficient of interest
is γ.Before entering the discussion on the problem of endogeneity and its possible solutions,
let us look at the results of the fixed-effects estimation of equation (1) presented in Table
2. The coefficient of seizures rate is negative and statistically significant at all conventional
levels, and does not change in magnitude with inclusion of different controls. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first evidence of a stable and statistically significant negative
relationship between cocaine seizures and consumption.
Table 2: Including various controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.061***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
income 1.074** 1.207** 1.212** 1.313** 1.311**
(0.516) (0.530) (0.533) (0.627) (0.623)
unemp 0.011 0.041 0.036 0.046 0.045
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)






constant 4.674*** -9.355 4.527*** -11.627 -11.690 -15.419 -15.393
(0.164) (6.698) (0.558) (7.042) (7.064) (11.119) (11.070)
Obs 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
Nclust 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
R2 0.076 0.083 0.076 0.084 0.086 0.088 0.089
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
While endogeneity of seizures and ways to tackle it will be discussed in the remaining sec-
11It is possible that enforcement activity makes consumers more cautious which in turn would affect demand.
This impact would operate in the same direction, reinforcing the idea that more intense enforcement should be
related to lower quantity consumed. However, the enforcement measure of interest considered in our analysis is the
volumes seized, and it is unlikely that they have a clear effect on demand, since they are ambiguously linked to
perceived enforcement presence.
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tions, it is useful to comment on potential endogeneity of selected controls. At the individual
level, income (as well as unemployment) and cocaine consumption are very likely to be re-
lated in both directions, so reverse causality would be an issue. However, here we are working
with macro-level data and it is reasonable to believe that cocaine-related hospitalization rates
(which are, in fact, rather low, as appears from Table 1) do not cause changes in province-
level income or unemployment. Regarding the crime rate for criminal associations and the
rate of foreign residents, it is possible that markets with expanding demand (provinces with
higher cocaine-related hospitalization rates) attract more supply, which in the case of illicit
drugs markets is tightly likned to organized crime and foreigners involved in the business
(as required by trafficking and distribution networks). However, we believe that diffusion of
criminal networks and their members’ ethnicity are largely determined by other factors, such
as historical routes and institutional quality, which change slowly and are unlikely to vary
significantly from one year to another, while local drug consumption should play a smaller
role; thus, though with caution, it is plausible to assume that the crime rates for criminal as-
sociation and the rates of foreign residents are not driven by cocaine consumption in the local
markets. Therefore, we argue that the list of controls in the baseline model is as exogenous
as possible in the given setting.
At this point a brief discussion on the main drivers of results could be of interest. While
the literature fails to find a significant negative relationship between seizures and consump-
tion, we are able to capture it with our data. This could be explained by the substantial
disaggregation in space and Italy’s geographic features discussed in Section 3, which allows
to observe very high volumes of cocaine seized in some provinces. Additionally, most of the
provinces with exceptionally high cocaine seizure rates are not the ones with the highest hos-
pitalization rates, which suggests that simultaneity problem is not as severe as often is in other
settings, where due to data availability issues only big cities are considered. This could be an
indication that the significant negative relationship is driven by provinces with high seizures
rates: indeed, if they are excluded from the sample, the relationship becomes insignificant
(see Column 1 vs. 2 in Table 3).
Table 3: Baseline on different subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.06*** -0.08 0.47* -0.20***
(0.01) (0.19) (0.26) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 465 210 255
Nclust 103 93 42 51
R2 0.089 0.095 0.166 0.141
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard
errors in parentheses.
However, this does not mean that bulk seizures are the only drivers of the result, since si-
multaneity could still be responsible for masking the true relationship. To check if this is the
case, we excluded the ten provinces with the highest average volumes seized and split the
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remaining sample into two parts: with higher and lower average consumption levels. Columns
3 and 4 of Table 3 provide results for high and low-consumption provinces respectively. While
the negative relationship holds for low-consumption areas, enforcement in high-consumption
areas is much more likely to be driven by local market conditions12. This finding provides
evidence of reverse causality present in the data to a certain extent. In the remaining part of
the paper we discuss other potential sources of endogeneity and propose ways to solve it.
5.3 Methodological challenges
The relationship discovered in the baseline model is likely to be biased due to endogeneity of
seizures rate. With the data at hand endogeneity may emerge from all three possible sources,
which are briefly described below:
1. Simultaneity: areas with higher consumption attract more enforcement. This may be
partially alleviated by the inclusion of the fixed effects, but it would be unrealistic to
assume that local market features, enforcement and their relationship are time-invariant.
Some evidence of the presence of simultaneity bias was provided in the previous subsec-
tion.
2. Measurement error: since the data on purity is not available, errors in the measurement
of pure substance seized are likely. However, this is less of a concern for bulk seizures,
as wholesale seizures are generally high in purity13. We will assume that the "true"
measure and the error in measurement, if present, are uncorrelated, leaving us with an
attenuation bias that drives the coefficient towards zero.
3. Omitted variable bias: other variables, correlated with both seizures and hospitalization
rates, may produce an upward or a downward bias of the seizures coefficient. Corruption,
other enforcement activities, and seizures in other provinces may be relevant omitted
variables. Most importantly, the actual amount of the drug available in the market is
unobserved and therefore we do not know whether an increase in seizures is a signal of
increased or decreased supply.
5.4 Solutions to methodological challenges
In the first attempt to alleviate endogeneity stemming from omitted variable bias we try in-
cluding additional possibly relevant controls: corruption and other enforcement activities. For
instance, arrests of drug sellers could influence consumption and would be positively related
to seizures. Failing to account for this variable will produce a downward bias of the coeffi-
cient of interest and overstate the impact of seizures. On the other hand, corruption may be
negatively related to seizures because corrupt officials would allow the traffickers and dealers
to operate more freely and turn a blind eye to the growing levels of consumption. Omitting
this variable would produce a bias towards zero.
The data from the Ministry of Interior allows us to control directly for the number of drug-
related arrests and anti-drug operations: as evident from Column 2 of Table 4, including
these enforcement measures does not alter the coefficient of the seizures rate as compared to
the baseline case in Column 1, while they themselves are insignificant. These variables are
12We ran a similar check using quantile panel approach and obtained similar results: see subsection A.2 of the
Appendix for details.
13Data on cross-country differences in prices and purity of cocaine at wholesale and retail levels are available from
UNODC (https://data.unodc.org/)
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endogenous themselves and were therefore not included in the baseline; a separate instrument
would be needed for each one in order to identify their true coefficients. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to show that their inclusion does not alter the coefficient of interest.
Regarding corruption, if it is thought of as a time-invariant feature then it is already controlled
for by inclusion of the fixed effect. It is plausible, however, that corruption is not constant over
time, which requires a time-variant measure of it. The best available province-level corruption
proxy that is time-variant is an indicator constructed for the Institutional Quality Index for
Italy, which is an index built in a similar manner to the World Government Indicator. This
index consists of several dimensions: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, reg-
ulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption (Nifo and Vecchione, 2014). The corruption index
is a composite measure and consists of three subindexes: number of crimes against the public
administration relative to the number of public servants; the Golden-Picci Index (difference
between the physically existing public infrastructure and the amounts of funds cumulatively
allocated by the government to create these public works (Golden and Picci, 2005); and the
share of overruled municipalities. The main drawback of this measure is that it is available
only for the years no later than 2012; we therefore rerun the baseline on the 2010-2012 sub-
sample (Column 3 of Table 4). The results in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that including the
time-variant corruption proxy does not alter the coefficient of interest. Since the time-variant
proxy is not available for the whole time span, it is not included in the baseline model.
Table 4: Controlling for corruption and other enforcement measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.035*** -0.035***







constant -15.306 -14.571 -6.467 -6.581
(10.280) (9.852) (13.864) (14.308)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 515 309 309
Nclust 103 103 103 103
R2 0.089 0.110 0.039 0.039
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
It is possible that other omitted variables and sources of endogeneity exist; instrumental vari-
ables are usually adopted to address this issue. In crime literature external instruments were
traditionally applied, however, since finding an external instrument which is both exogenous
and relevant is problematic, more and more studies resort to internal instruments, and provide
evidence that they can even outperform their external counterparts (Bun, 2015, Bun et al.,
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2016). We compare results from both approaches, with cargo turnover rate in ports serving as
an external instrument, and lags of seizures rates as internal instruments in the Arellano-Bond
framework, as well as spatial lags of exogenous variables applying Spatial 2SLS to estimate a
SAR model. Finally, we resort to spatial analysis that differs from traditional spatial econo-
metrics approaches to explore the relationship between seizures in the main trafficking hubs
and consumption in other provinces, as well as the relation between consumption in a given
province and seizures in the adjacent provinces.
6 Instrumental variables estimation
In this section we propose several ways to instrument for the seizures variable: cargo turnover
rate in western coast seaports (an external instrument), time lags of explanatory variables
(internal instruments in the Arellano-Bond framework), and spatial lags of exogenous variables
within a SAR model (internal instruments in the Spatial 2SLS framework).
6.1 External Instrument
The largest volumes seized and the highest variation in seizures rates occur either in high con-
sumption areas (large local markets, such as Milan and Rome), or in logistically convenient
trafficking points (here seizures are roughly exogenous with respect to local market condi-
tions), which are mostly border areas and vital transportation knots (e.g. ports, airports,
train stations). Figures 1 and 2 provide a visualization of the consumption and seizures pat-
terns; while the highest hospitalization rates cluster in the North (the richest macro region),
the largest amounts seized are observed in the border areas, in particular, in the western part
of the country. Because maritime transportation is cheaper and allows for transporting much
higher volumes of cargo than aerial, it is often preferred by the traffickers. Thus, it is not
surprising that maritime seizures account for the majority of border seizures (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Distribution of seizures in customs areas by border type (average shares)
Since cocaine comes from the western part of the world where it is produced, ceteris paribus
it is optimal to ship it to the Western coastline of the country (as compared to the Eastern).
This is exactly why we observe very high amounts seized in the provinces that have maritime
borders and are located in the West.
For these reasons, we adopt maritime cargo turnover rate14 in the ports of 16 western
14Since all the variables in the baseline specification are expressed in terms of rates, for consistency we adopt a
turnover rate measure, which is absolute cargo turnover in port(s) divided by the population of the province.
23
provinces15 (Figure 4 depicts the centroids of selected provinces) as an instrument for seizures
rates. As can be seen from the adjacent table, cocaine seizures in these ports amount for
60-80% of the country’s total throughout the given period16.
Figure 4: The 16 selected provinces and their share in total volume of cocaine seized
For the instrument to be valid, it should be relevant and exogenous. The cargo turnover rate
in the selected provinces is strongly and positively associated with cocaine seizures (Column
2 of Table 5), confirming that the instrument is relevant.
Regarding the exogeneity of the instrument, the exclusion restriction builds upon two main
assumptions:
1. Increased turnover implies increased customs vigilance. One of the obvious reasons
to increase vigilance are taxation revenues: the customs would be interested to check
whether all the goods on board are properly declared and all the necessary duties are
paid. The authorities are also aware of the fact that higher freight turnover can make
smuggling easier and respond correspondingly by increasing monitoring. Finally, it could
be higher amount of cargo from specific source countries (e.g. Latin American region)
that makes the authorities more cautious.
2. This intensification of enforcement translates into higher seizures and, conditional on
covariates, only affects consumption through this channel. A potential threat to validity
comes from the fact that cargo turnover rate can be viewed as a proxy for economic
activity, and so can affect consumption not only through seizures, but also through
income, for instance. If we believe that all the variables in our main equation are
exogenous, this is not an issue, since we control for income and unemployment. Another
potential threat is that higher turnover rate may be associated to higher volumes of
cocaine transiting through the port (which is plausible if higher volumes of licit trade
provide more opportunities for traffickers to smuggle). If the observed increase in seizures
rates is not due to increased enforcement but to increased cocaine supply, the exclusion
15The total number of ports is larger than 16, however the data for port-level turnover exists only for the large
ports, which also happen to be the main trafficking hubs. In fact, restricting the number of port provinces to 9
with the highest seizures yields identical results. We chose to keep the cargo values for all of the available western
coast provinces since they are already very few, accounting for around 16% of the sample. For all other provinces
the value of cargo is taken as zero. Data source: reports of Italian Port Association (assoporti.it).
16According to the yearly reports of the Central Directorate for the Antidrug Services (Ministry of Interior).
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restriction does not hold. Yet, higher turnover implies lower speed of the process of going
through the customs, which increases risks of being caught. Dell (2015) also points out
that congestion costs at the bottlenecks, such as ports and terrestrial borders, play a
big role and are accounted for in the traffickers’ optimization problem for finding the
optimal route. Additionally, as was mentioned in the previous point, the customs officials
are perfectly aware of the fact that higher turnover may incentivize smuggling, which
implies increased vigilance from their side: this increases probability of detection and
decreases traffickers’ expected payoffs. If this reasoning applies, it is plausible to believe
that increased turnover rate does not imply higher amounts of drug entering the ports,
therefore, the exclusion restriction holds.
Table 5 provides the results of a fixed effects estimation with the cargo turnover rate in the
western coast ports used as an instrument. Column 1 has the baseline result and Columns 2
and 3 represent the first and the second stages respectively (variable turnover_rate stands
for the cargo turnover rate). The coefficient of the seizures rate is about 2.8 times higher
than that of the fixed effect baseline model and is significant at the 1% confidence level. Due
to the instrument taking non-zero values only for the sixteen selected provinces, which are
concurrently the ones with high volumes seized, this result is again driven by provinces with
high seizures. However, an important difference is that we were now able to capture the
variation in seizures that corresponds to the actual decrease in supply.
6.2 Internal instruments
Since the nature of the problem and lack of data prevent us from directly proving the validity of
the assumptions made for the external instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction, we resort
to internal instruments and compare the results with those obtained using cargo turnover as an
instrument. The Arellano-Bond methodology (Arellano and Bond, 1991) proposes using lags
of the exogenous explanatory variables as instruments for the endogenous and predetermined
ones. This approach is typically applied to first-differenced specifications with the lagged
value of the dependent variable present in the right hand side of the equation. The lag is
predetermined by construction, therefore in order to identify its coefficient additional moment
conditions are necessary. These conditions are created by using lags of exogenous variables as
instruments. Moreover, by the same means this approach also allows for identification of the
coefficients of endogenous variables, if they are present. In our setting the empirical model
is not concerned with the impact of consumption in the previous year on that of the current
year, but there is an endogenous variable whose effect is of interest. Therefore, the relevance of
internal instruments with respect to the seizures rate variable determines the choice of the lag
depth of controls. Column 4 of Table 5 provides the results of the Arellano-Bond estimation
of the equation in first differences:
∆HArit = ∆HArit−1 + τt + γ∆Sit + δ∆Xit + ∆εit (2)
The model passes formal tests but there appears to be a problem of weak instruments: the
standard error of the seizures coefficient is quite high, yielding significance only at the 10%
level, and insignificant estimate in some cases, depending on the instruments specification.
However, the magnitude of the effect is similar to what was found with an external instrument.
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6.3 SAR model
Finally, we apply the same principle and exploit spatial lags of exogenous variables as internal
instruments. In classical spatial econometrics literature17, both theoretical and applied, the
main issue has been to identify the coefficient of the spatial lag of the dependent variable,
although spatial components are present in those models in other forms as well (e.g. the
Spatial Error Model accounts for the spatial component in the error terms, and the Spatial
Durbin Model allows for spatial lags of both the dependent and the independent variables to
be present). By analogy with the Arellano-Bond case, we apply the Spatial 2SLS methodology
(Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) aiming to identify the point estimate of seizures, while the spatial
lag of hospital admission rates is not the main focus18. Spatial interactions, however, are also
of great interest, and we provide the corresponding analysis in Section 7.
We estimate a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model of the following form:
HArit = ρWHAr + ai + τt + γSit + δXit + εit (3)
Here, in addition to spatial lag order and number of variables chosen as instruments, it is nec-
essary to choose also the underlying spatial structure: the weight matrix W. Results presented
in Column 5 of Table 5 are obtained with the second order contiguity row-standardized spatial
matrix. As in the previous case, the obtained coefficient is marginally significant and some-
times insignificant depending on the spatial lags and type of W chosen, but point estimate is
similar throughout different specifications and to the two previously obtained.
Table 5: Baseline FE and instrumental variable specifications
FE FS IV AB SAR
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.061*** -0.177*** -0.176* -0.172*







Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 515 515 515 515
Nclust 103 103 103 103 103
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
The results of the baseline model suggest that a one standard deviation increase in a province’s
cocaine seizures rate is associated with a 0.033 standard deviation decrease in related hospi-
17For an overview of different types of spatial models see Elhorst (2010).
18Inclusion of temporal/spatial lags is useful, since they possibly account for omitted variables. In our case these
specifications can be viewed as robustness checks.
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talization rates; with an instrumental variables approach this effect reaches a 0.093 standard
deviation (the effects are calculated at the mean).
7 Spatial interactions
Until now we have been focusing on uncovering the relationship between cocaine consumption
and seizures in a given province. However, it is clear that the observations are not independent
in space: seizures in one province may also have an impact on its neighbours’ consumption.
Most importantly, seizures anywhere else are much more exogenous than those in the same
province. In this section we aim to explore spatial interactions in two complementary ways:
first we study how seizures in entry points affect consumption in other provinces, and then
investigate the relationship between seizures in the neighbouring provinces and consumption
in a given province in a more general way.
7.1 Relation to seizures in selected provinces
We return to the western coast provinces with high volumes of cocaine seized and analyze
how seizures in these provinces affect consumption in the rest of the country19. We focus on
the nine20 western coast port provinces (Reggio Calabria, Roma, Livorno, Genova, Savona,
La Spezia, Napoli, Sassari, and Cagliari) and study how consumption elsewhere responds to
cocaine seizures in these provinces, estimating the following fixed effects specification:
HArit = ai + τt + γ0Sit + γ1Snearestit + γ2Snearestit ∗ disti + δXit + εit (4)
Here Snearestit stands for seizures in one of the nine provinces that is closest to a given
province i, and Snearest ∗ dist - interaction with distance21 to that province. Columns 1 and
2 of Table 6 contain results for equation 4 without including interaction with distance, for the
whole sample and for the case when the selected nine provinces are excluded, respectively.
Without accounting for distance, seizures in the nearest port appear to be insignificant, and
excluding the nine provinces yields an insignificant coefficient of the own seizures rate in the
remaining subsample. Estimation results for the full equation are presented in Columns 3 and
4 of the table; accounting for distance yields significant estimates of γ1 and γ2, which are also
jointly significant.
19 In Section 8.2 we do several robustness checks and provide results of the same analysis but with alternative
groups of provinces chosen as the key provinces that influence consumption everywhere else.
20Out of the 16 provinces whose port turnover was used as instrument, these nine provinces are the ones with
the largest seizures, among the top 12 by average volumes seized, and are the drivers of the previous result.
21In Section 8.1 other distance/proximity measures are also explored.
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Table 6: Relation with seizures in the nine port provinces
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.0603*** 0.0465 -0.0573*** 0.0407 -0.0608*** 0.0499
(0.0097) (0.0987) (0.0097) (0.0910) (0.0121) (0.0998)
Snearest -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0010** -0.0011**





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 470 515 470 515 470
Nclust 103 94 103 94 103 94
R2 0.089 0.087 0.098 0.097 0.089 0.087
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
In order to interpret the results we depict the effects predicted by the model on a color map
(Figure 6). On the horizontal axis the volume of cocaine seized in the nearest port province is
plotted with the maximum value corresponding to the maximum volume of yearly seizures in
one of the nine provinces (Reggio Calabria) observed in the data. On the vertical axis is the
distance to this province so that low values mean higher proximity. The dots represent the
data points and red and blue lines correspond to the median and mean values respectively.
Figure 5: The total effect of seizures in nearest port province depending on the
volume seized and distance
While it is true that higher volumes seized have a negative impact on consumption and it is
more pronounced for the closer provinces, the relationship is reversed for relatively low seizure
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values. Our interpretation of this finding is that when the volumes seized are relatively low
they are, in fact, mirroring supply, and so are positively related to consumption in the nearby
provinces. However, when large volumes are seized, there is a decrease in the actual amount
of cocaine available in the local markets which is substantial enough to decrease cocaine con-
sumption.
For a province located at the mean, a 500 kilograms increase in cocaine seized in the nearest
port (500 kilograms is one standard deviation of volumes seized in the selected nine provinces)
corresponds to a decrease in the hospitalization rates by about 0.018 standard deviation. An
analogous decrease would occur if an average province would have been located 40 kilometers
closer to the nearest port province. For a mean value of kilograms seized in a nearest port,
which is around 420 kilograms, the effect of such seizure varies from -0.46 for the closest pos-
sible province (about 35 kilometers) and becomes zero for the provinces located more than
180 kilometers from this nearest port.
Finally, we check if local markets are supplied by more than one key province. As was
revealed in the study by Tzvetkova et al. (2014), dealers at all levels usually have multiple
suppliers; therefore, we adopt a measure that takes into account proximity to all of the key
provinces: Avg_dist =
∑9
i=1 Si ∗ disti, which is the sum of seizures in all the nine selected
provinces, weighted by distances. We estimate equation 4 with the Avg_dist variable instead
of Snearest and Snearest ∗ dist. According to the results presented in Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 6, the variable is not significant; it does not imply, however, a contradiction with the
qualitative evidence from drug dealers’ interviews: the interchangeability of suppliers might
be present on the local level but not on the country level. This is quite reasonalble, since
due to the illegal nature of the business long-distance travelling is minimized to reduce risks.
Thus, while dealers may resort to several suppliers, most or all of these suppliers might be
sourced through the same major entry point. Another reason could be the tight interconnec-
tion between drug business and organized crime22; in certain cases local markets are clearly
divided between groups and subgroups so that freedom to choose a supplier may be limited.
7.2 The SLX model
In this final section we make an attempt to account for spatial interactions in a more unified
way. Differently from what has been done in most of the spatial econometric literature, we
adopt an SLX model which was originally proposed by Gibbons and Overman (2012) and fur-
ther developed in the applied direction by Halleck Vega and Elhorst (2015). They highlight
that the SLX approach is more flexible in modelling spatial spillover effects as compared to
other spatial econometrics models (SAR, SEM, SAC, SDM), and should be preferred or at
least taken as a point of departure in empirical analysis when there is no underlying theory
suggesting to opt for a particular specification (as in Ertur and Koch, 2007). In our setting an
SLX model is the most intuitive choice; one would be interested in the relationship between
consumption in a given province and seizures in neighboring provinces, rather than focusing
on the relationship between consumption in a given province and that of the neighbours. In
fact, seizures in neighbouring provinces are an important variable per se that should be in-
cluded since it is potentially related to both seizures and consumption in a given province,
and at the same time is much more exogenous than own province seizures. Additionally, an
22Another interesting feature of drug markets in Italy is the coexistence of two business models: a vertically
integrated monopoly is present in the areas where Camorra is in power, while rather free competition is common
for northern areas where no dominating criminal group exists.
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advantage of the SLX approach is that it allows to parameterize the spatial weight matrix W,
while other models do not. Most commonly W is chosen based on the geographical proximity
of units since generally neighboring units are interrelated with each other. However, in spe-
cific contexts this assumption seems too restrictive, and so Halleck Vega and Elhorst (2015)
suggest parameterizing W unless there is a theory suggesting a particular W be adopted (as
in Buonanno et al., 2012).
The SLX specification in our case will take the following form:
HArit = ai + τt + βSit + θWS + δXit + εit, (5)
whereWS is the spatial lag of seizures rates. Following Halleck Vega and Elhorst, we adopt an
inverse distance spatial weight matrix, with zeros on the main diagonal and the off-diagonal
elements taking value wij = 1/dij , normalized by maximum eigenvalue. In the course of




where γ is an additional parameter that is also estimated, together with β, θ, δ and the fixed
effects. The estimate of γ will provide an understanding of how fast the effects actually fade
away with distance.
We also make an attempt to extend the external IV approach and use the spatial lag of
cargo turnover rate as an additional instrument. Table 7 is organized as follows. Columns 1
and 2 contain results of the baseline and IV estimate23 from Section 6; in Column 3 we used
two variables as instruments for the seizures rate: the previously adopted cargo turnover in
key ports and its spatial lag, and the point estimates are quite similar. Column 4 contains
the output from the pure SLX model estimation where all variables are considered exogenous,
with the seizures spatial lag point estimate equal to -0.39. This last result is similar to the
one obtained when the seizures rate in own province is treated as endogenous and instru-
mented with cargo turnover only (Column 5). Though marginally significant, in line with our
expectations the coefficient is negative, indicating that higher seizures in adjacent provinces
are associated with a decrease in hospitalization rates in a given location. Next, Column 6
represents the IV estimation of the SLX equation with endogenous S, now instrumented with
both turnover_rate and W_turnover_rate. Interestingly, the point estimate of WS jumps
drastically, by more than 10 times, as compared to previous cases which could suggest that it
is also endogenous. To take this possibility into account, we estimated the SLX model treating
both seizures in own province and spatial lag as endogenous, instrumenting them with cargo
turnover and its spatial lag (Column 7). The point estimate of WS is now -1.09, which seems
more reasonable as compared to the previous case.
Given these point estimates, we can quantify the relationships and the effects. The baseline
SLX model suggests that a one standard deviation increase in WS is associated with a 0.036
standard deviation decrease in local consumption. This finding is very similar to the relation-
ship with seizures rate in own province, where the effect is 0.033. The magnitude of the effect
of a one standard deviation increase in WS implied by results in Column 6 is the highest and
reaches a 0.37 standard deviation decrease in hospitalization rates, while a point estimate in
23A slight difference of results with respect to those previously obtained is due to using 9 key provinces as
opposed to 16. This is done because in the current section we now use 2 instruments, so that reduction in the first
instrument’s variation is compensated by adopting its spatial lag.
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Column 7 implies this effect to be 0.1.
Table 7: SLX model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.061*** -0.162*** -0.198*** -0.062*** -0.159*** -0.191*** -0.155***
(0.010) (0.029) (0.035) (0.010) (0.030) (0.067) (0.036)
Wseizr -0.390* -0.416* -5.989** -1.093*
(0.219) (0.217) (2.922) (0.602)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
γ 0.63 1.01 1.01 0.15 1.09
Obs 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
Nclust 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
R2 0.089 0.062 0.040 0.094 0.070 0.070 0.046
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Whether the spatial lag of seizures should be considered as endogenous itself is debatable. In
the abovementioned paper, Vega and Elhorst suggest to test for endogeneity of the spatial lag
by regressing the dependent variable on the residuals from the first step. However, this test
may yield illogical results (e.g. indicating that WS is endogenous and S itself is exogenous -
in fact, this is what they get in their case, and suggest to opt for a model with the spatial
lag treated as exogenous; interestingly, with our data we obtained the same outcome). From
the formal testing point of view, the model in Column 6 outperforms other specifications
that have been presented by substantially improving both the strength and exogeneity of the
instrument set. Another thing worth noting is that in this specification the optimal value of γ
was estimated to be 0.15. This is in line with what we show in the following section, suggesting
that the effects of seizures in neighbouring provinces fade with distance much slower than a
plain inverse distance function would suggest.
8 Robustness checks
8.1 Different distance functions
Table 8 below provides results of estimating equations with distance interactions (eq. 4)
for the full (Columns 1-3) and restricted (Columns 4-6) samples using inverse instead of
plain distances. The results are different from what was obtained before: seizures in the
nearest port are still insignificant and their interaction with inverse distance is negative and
marginally significant, and these two variables are not significant jointly. The average weighted
by distance is now negative and marginally significant. It appears that plain inversion punishes
distance too much, assuming the effect of port province seizures to be less far-reaching than
it really is. This would also explain why the Avg_invd coefficient has the same sign and
significance level as the Snearest ∗ invd: since the effect decays rapidly with distance, the
most relevant constituent of the average weighted by distance is still the nearest port province.
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Table 8: Using inverse distances as a proximity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 0.046 0.032 0.036
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.099) (0.088) (0.092)
Snearest -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 515 515 470 470 470
Nclust 103 103 103 94 94 94
R2 0.089 0.096 0.093 0.087 0.095 0.091
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
With a different proximity measure, that allows the decay not to diminish as fast as a pure
inverse would suggest, the results are very similar to the plain distance case. Tables 9 and
10 contain estimation outputs using distance−0.05 and exp−alpha∗distance proximity measures
respectively.
Table 9: Using distance−0.05 as a proximity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.059*** 0.033 -0.030 0.045







Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 470 515 470
Nclust 103 94 103 94
R2 0.100 0.099 0.090 0.088
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 10: Using exponential discounting with alpha = 10−6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.057*** 0.040 -0.062*** 0.048







Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 470 515 470
Nclust 103 94 103 94
R2 0.099 0.098 0.089 0.087
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
8.2 Different key province groupings
Here we provide the results of the spatial analysis in terms of relation to seizures in key
provinces using slightly different groupings. In Section 7 we used nine provinces of the western
coast.
Table 11: Relation to seizures in top-9 provinces by average amount seized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.0602*** -0.0634 -0.0615*** -0.0639 -0.0585*** -0.0642
(0.0102) (0.1099) (0.0105) (0.1054) (0.0125) (0.1105)
Snearest -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0009* -0.0011**





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 470 515 470 515 470
Nclust 103 94 103 94 103 94
R2 0.089 0.095 0.096 0.105 0.089 0.095
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 11 contains results of estimating equation 4 for the top nine provinces by average yearly
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amount of cocaine seized (full sample used in odd columns, and excluding these top nine
provinces in even columns). Since the majority of seizures take place in the western coastline
provinces with ports, the top nine group is very similar to the original nine ports group, with
the exceptions of Milan and Varese now replacing Savona and Cagliari. Perhaps, this is the
reason why the results are almost the same: both signs and absolute values of the point esti-
mates are identical to those in the baseline nine ports case.
Table 12 contains the results for the top nine provinces by average seizures rates selected
as a key province group. In this grouping, as compared to the nine ports case, we have
Varese, Trento and Pisa instead of Roma, Cagliari and Napoli. It appears that absolute vol-
umes, rather than rates, are more relevant in determining which provinces’ seizures have an
impact on consumption in the rest of the country.
Table 12: Relation to seizures in top-nine provinces by seizure rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hapop hapop hapop hapop hapop hapop
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
seizr -0.0615*** 0.1701 -0.0611*** 0.1607 -0.0591*** 0.0186
(0.0103) (0.2769) (0.0108) (0.2763) (0.0125) (0.0891)
Snearest -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 515 470 515 470 515 470
Nclust 103 94 103 94 103 94
R2 0.093 0.085 0.093 0.086 0.089 0.081
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
9 Conclusion
Studying illicit markets is facinating but intrinsically difficult. Due to the clandestine nature
of the phenomenon, our knowledge of it, at least at the general public level, is very limited.
Currently existing and openly available data is sparse and often of low quality. This hin-
ders the possibility to rigorously study many policy-relevant questions and implies that any
results obtained should be treated with caution. This paper is concerned with studying the
relationship and effects of law enforcement, specifically illicit drug seizures, on drug consump-
tion, proxied by drug-related hospital admission rates, using the case of the cocaine market
in Italy. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first evidence of a stable negative
relationship between cocaine seizures and cocaine consumption. Contrary to existing studies,
we tackle the endogeneity of seizures by implementing the instrumental variable approach,
using both internal and external (western coast provinces’ cargo turnover in ports) instru-
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ments. According to our findings, a one standard deviation increase in cocaine seizure rates
leads on average to a decrease in hospitalization rates by about 3.3% in the baseline case and
by 10% of a standard deviation if endogeneity is properly addressed. However, this result is
driven by a relatively small group of provinces with high volumes of cocaine seized. In order
to explore how those bulk seizures affect consumption in the rest of the country, we conduct
the spatial interactions analysis by studying how cocaine consumption relates to seizures in
seaport provinces. Our results suggest that when seizures in the nearest port province are
large enough, their impact on consumption elsewhere is negative and more pronounced for
closer units. Finally, we resort to an SLX model to investigate how cocaine consumption is
related to seizures in the neighbouring provinces in general. The results vary depending on the
exact specification but all suggest that the relationship is negative and at least as considerable
in magnitude as the relationship with the seizures in own province.
These results are not only the first evidence of spatial interrelations between seizures and
consumption, but may also be suggestive from the policy implications point of view. Specif-
ically, we find that a province with 500.000 residents that is within a 130 kilometer distance
(we consider it as being closely positioned) to a key port province on average exhibits a larger
decrease in cocaine consumption from additional 50 kilograms seized in the port province than
if that same amount was seized in the province itself. In other words, given that provinces in
close proximity to the key port provinces greatly benefit from larger quantities seized in ports,
a policy-maker who allocates enforcement resources on a country level and wishes to minimize
consumption levels should shift the forces further away from the ports (with ports still being
the main enforcement centers), rather than locating them right next to the port provinces.
If that was the strategy currently adopted by the authorities, we would have observed that
an increase in cocaine volumes seized in the port provinces is associated with a decrease in
seizures rates in adjacent provinces. However, we do not find evidence in support of this in
the data, and it may suggest that there is a potential to further decrease the overall levels of
cocaine consumption by relocating enforcement from the provinces that are close neighbours
of port provinces to those units that are further away.
There are several possible directions for future research. Firstly, in this work we focused on
cocaine markets. Studying markets for other types of drugs may provide insights into whether
seizures of heroin, hashish and marijuana are related to consumption of those drugs in a simi-
lar way as was discovered for the cocine market. Additionally, incorporating all types of drugs
in a single empirical model would allow to investigate their substitution/complementarity for
Italian users. Secondly, the unique Italian setting potentially allows to study the effectiveness
of law enforcement on differently organized drug markets (but located within the same coun-
try): the mafia-controlled vertically integrated monopoly with strict rules for the participants
and the relatively free competition in the areas with no dominating criminal group present.
Finally, similar analysis on cross-country level might provide insights for antidrug supply-side
policies on a global scale.
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A.2 Quantile panel estimation
Apart from running a baseline model on subsamples with high and low consumption levels
(Table 3), we also adopt quantile regression technique for panel data (Powell, 2014) to in-
vestigate whether seizures rates and consumption are interrelated in a different way for units
located in different parts of consumption distribution.
In order to apply this methodology, we within-normalize all the right handside variables,
so that Xnewit =
Xit−X̄it
sd(Xit)
(note that the obtained coefficients should not be interpreted in
the same way as in the baseline FE regression), and run the quantile panel estimation using
adaptive MCMC optimization with 20.000 draws. The figure below depicts the resulting point
estimates of the normalized seizures rates coefficients, together with 95% confidence intervals,
for a range of quantiles (from 0.1 to 0.9).
Figure 6: Coefficient of seizures rates for different quantiles of consumption distribution
The qualitative result is the same as that obtained with a sample split: the coefficient of
seizures rate is negative for lower consumption quantiles and positive for high quantiles, which








This paper studies the response of the Russian households’ consumption expenditures to becom-
ing eligible for maternity capital assistance: a lump-sum non-cash grant worth about $10.000,
which mothers of the second and higher order child born after the 1st of January 2007 are
allowed to invest in housing, children’s education or retirement fund; in most of the cases this
financial support becomes accessible only after the eligibility-granting child reaches three years
of age. Through the prism of the wealth effects literature, we view becoming eligible to the as-
sistance as experiencing a positive wealth shock, which, unlike negative shocks, is an uncommon
event in developing countries. Our results suggest that, on average, households’ consumption
expenditure patterns do not change in response to becoming eligible for the assistance; however,
this null average effect masks important heterogeneities: households with particularly low lev-
els of wealth (tenants) do react to becoming eligible by increasing consumption of nondurable
goods. We also find strong evidence of consumption smoothing by consuming from wealth,
which was observed in partial liquification periods, when the government allowed withdraw-
ing small amounts in cash during economic downturns: households actively consumed from
the assistance to smooth consumption in occurrence of negative income shocks. Finally, we
document the presence of liquidity constraints: housing wealth of eligible households mostly
increases three years after the child was born, only when the assistance becomes available to
purchase housing without getting a loan.
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1 Introduction and motivation
Due to low fertility rates the Russian federal government launched a pro-natalist policy mea-
sure in 2007. Once in a lifetime a woman who gives birth to or adopts a second or consecutive
child is eligible to "maternity capital" assistance (around $10,000 in 2007, adjusted for inflation
on yearly basis) which can be obtained after the child reached three years of age and only in
no-cash form (to avoid parents spending money on random purposes) for the following needs:
invested in children’s education, housing (buying a new house or taking a mortgage) or put
on the mother’s pension account. The program is, obviously, quite costly: the share of related
expenditures in total government expenditures has increased from 1% in 2010 to 2.2% in 20161,
however, whether the policy was successful in reaching its goals is questionable.
Virtually from the very beginning of the program there has been a lot of discussion around
its effects, design and general adequacy. Given that the liabilities due to the program are very
large, many claim that its effects are too small: families tend to reschedule births, but do not
increase the desired number of children. Others insist that it is the design that causes inef-
ficiency: for majority of cases it is necessary to wait three years after the eligibility-granting
child is born; restricting the ways of the use of the assistance also diminishes its subjective value
for the families. Current discussions on demographic policies primarily touch upon maternity
capital program: among the recent suggestions were turning to cash and allowing families to
withdraw the full amount of assistance, and extensive expansion by granting the assistance to
families with the first-order newborn child.
The current study aims to capture the responses of Russian households to becoming eligi-
ble to the assistance in terms of their consumption expenditure patterns. This would not only
be highly relevant from the policy-makers’ point of view, but also relate to the wide strand
of the wealth shock literature: the peculiarity of our approach is treating becoming eligible
to the assistance as a positive wealth shock, so that households are expected to change their
consumption expenditure patterns even before the assistance is fully accessible (three years
after the second or higher order child was born) to be spent on any of the ways specified by the
law. In addition to testing responses to the wealth shock, we investigate whether households
exhibit smoothing behaviour and consume from wealth in the periods of economic downturns,
and whether and when they tend to execute their right for the grant by converting it into
housing value.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 locates our study in the ex-
isting literature and highlights main contributions, Section 3 describes in detail the design of
the policy and its evolution. Section 4 introduces data and the baseline empirical specification,
which is estimated in Section 5 along with other specifications. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Related literature and contribution
There is no doubt that policy-makers, as well as the general public, would be interested in
estimating the cost-efficiency of such a program. However, pure effects of this policy are very
difficult to pin down because it was not the only fertility-incentivizing reform that came into
action since 2007: in addition to the introduction of maternity capital, the government has also
increased child benefits and parental leave benefits. In principle, there is interest in assessing
1According to the data of the Pension Fund of Russia and the Ministry of Finance.
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the impact of the full package of reforms on fertility. Regarding households’ decisions to have
one more child, Chirkova (2013) estimates a binary choice model of fertility exploiting the vari-
ation in the financial incentives and concludes that the probability to have a second child has
increased after 2007, with the magnitude of the effect depending on the gender of the first child.
Slonimczyk and Yurko (2014) resort to a structural dynamic programming model of fertility
and labor force participation. They find that long-run fertility increased by about 0.15 children
per woman with increases in birth rates being larger among women who are married or cohab-
iting with a spouse and women with lower potential earnings. While increasing fertility, the
policy did not have disemployment effects. Additionally, no significant differences were found
when grouping women by observable skill levels, rural and urban areas of residence and em-
ployment status. Apart from these obvious variables of interest, the policy could have affected
many other outcomes worth investigating. Given that the funds are supposed to be spent on
housing, children’s education or retirement funds, the second set of outcomes that the policy
should have affected are housing wealth, expenditures on housing and expenditures on educa-
tion. Mukanova (2018) uses a mix of matching and difference-in-difference methodologies to
study the effect of becoming eligible to the assistance on housing expenditures (rent, municipal
services, construction materials) and education expenditures. She finds that eligibility decreases
housing expenditures at the year of second child’s birth by 18% and by approximately 35% three
years after, and increases education expenditures by 63% at the year of the second child’s birth.
Although our study is close to the abovementioned ones and could also be of interest for policy-
makers, our main contribution lies in treating becoming eligible to the assistance as a wealth
shock. Eligibility to maternity capital could have had an impact on household’s consumption
patterns even before it was allowed to spend the funds. For example, keeping in mind that
there is a substantial sum of money available to invest in improving housing conditions in the
future, the household might spend its current income differently (save less than they would if
were not eligible) and increase expenditure of other kinds: buy a car, or increase consumption
of non-durable goods such as food and clothing. Differently from the vast majority of existing
studies that focus on the impact of child benefits on fertility decisions and maternal labour
supply (Brugiavini et al. (2013), Cohen et al. (2013), Milligan (2005), González (2013)) and
child health and well-being (Milligan and Stabile (2009), Milligan and Stabile (2011)), we focus
on households’ consumption response to being eligible to the assistance. The most closely re-
lated papers would be that of González (2013), where she also investigates if households’ total
expenditures changed at the point when families became eligible for payment, and does not find
the effect; and Stephens Jr and Unayama (2015) who use a basic life-cycle/permanent income
hypothesis framework to analyse the impact of child benefits on household wealth accumulation.
In line with the model’s predictions, they find that higher cumulative benfits received increase
current assets, higher future benfit payments lower asset holding, these effects systematically
vary over the life cycle, and that there is heterogeneity in responses of liquidity constrained
and unconstrained households. Differently from their setting, in our case we are interested in
response of consumption to a wealth shock, rather than response of wealth to an income shock.
To the best of our knowledge existing literature on consumption in Russian context focuses on
consumption responses to income shocks rather than to wealth shocks (Stillman, 2001). An
extremely important feature of our setting is that it allows to study households’ responses to a
positive wealth shock.
Such analysis would be closest to the spirit of empirical literature that estimates wealth effects
on consumption, and bases on theoretical background found, for instance, in Deaton (1992). To
illustrate, we resort to a standard life-cycle model (particularly, in notation of Carroll (1997)):
a household lives for T periods and maximizes utility over the remainder of its lifetime by
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From equation (7) it is clear that household’s consumption is tightly related to wealth, and a
positive wealth change is expected to be accompanied by an increase in current consumption.
Therefore, the current study contributes to the vast literature that sheds light on the relation
between wealth shocks and consumption (e.g. Campbell and Cocco (2007), Case et al. (2005),
Christelis, Georgarakos, et al. (2015), Paiella and Pistaferri (2017), Bottazzi et al. (2017)).
A survey study by Paiella (2009) provides an overview of time-series and micro-econometric
evidence on the relationship between stock and housing wealth and consumer spending. These
two factors are the most frequently investigated, since financial market and housing prices
shocks are plausibly exogenous and unanticipated by individuals, which makes it convenient to
use such shocks as a source of exogenous variation to uncover the effects of wealth changes on
consumption. In this case, however, we face a peculiar kind of shock to a household’s wealth: a
shock that is not determined by macroeconomic dynamics, but results from a second or higher
order birth. One may argue that eligibility is highly endogenous. First, we note that even the
abovementioned macroeconomic shocks are not completely free from endogeneity issues. Co-
movements in house and stock prices and consumption are driven in part by common macro-
factors and not by causal link (Attanasio et al., 2009); constructing a portfolio and changing
its’ composition is a choice, based on the investor’s expectations about future changes in the
components’ value, etc. Secondly, while a decision to give birth to another child is still more
endogenous than decisions made conditional on macroeconomic environment, high levels of
uncertainty and low levels of trust towards government and financial institutions in Russia2
make the population treat any promises with caution, feeling safe only when all the official
documents that grant eligibility are at hand. This implies that anticipation effect is unlikely to
be present.
2These peculiar features of contemporary Russia are typically attributed to severe shocks the country experienced
in the 1990s (see, for example, Shlapentokh (2006) and Spicer and Pyle (2000)).
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3 Policy design
In this section we describe in more detail the design of the policy, as well as other fertility-
incentivizing measures which were adopted simultaneously.
The maternity capital program was launched on the 1st of January in 2007. Acording to
the new law, families, who adopted or gave birth to a second or consecutive child in 2007 or
later, were eligible to the government assistance of approximately $10.000 (adjusted for infla-
tion on the yearly basis3; at the moment, due to severe depreciation of the ruble in the past
years, in dollar terms the assistance would account for about $8.000 - roughly 70% of per capita
GDP). The peculiarity is that this assistance is available solely in the non-cash form. To avoid
careless spending, the initial version of the law allowed the assistance to be invested in three not
mutually exclusive ways: housing, children education or mother’s retirement fund. Moreover,
the assistance was available only after the child that granted eligibility to the household turned
three years of age. The coordinator of the program is the Pension Fund of Russia, which is
responsible for issuing certificates for eligible families who decided to apply, and for transferring
the funds to entities that provide related services (i.e. housing, education) according to the
needs of those families, who decided to activate the certificate.
Several significant changes have been made since the law was first enacted (see Figure 7 below).
Firstly, beginning in January 2009 the funds can be used for mortgage payments immediately
after the birth of the eligible child (i.e. without the three year waiting period); from May 2015
it is also allowed to use the maternity capital assistance as a first installment for housing loans.
Secondly, since August 2010 the funds can also be used for construction of housing (previously
it was allowed to use for acquiring housing only). Finally, from 2009 until March 2011, mater-
nity capital certificate holders were allowed to withdraw 12.000 rubles (around $400) in cash;
from May 2015 until March 2016 - 20.000 rubles.
Figure 7: Timeline of changes of the maternity capital policy
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From 2007 until 2015, the Pension Fund has issued certificates to 6.7 million families4, 50% of
families have spent the whole sum of assistance; about the same share accounts for certificates
requested for the purpose of improving housing conditions. 1360 billion rubles was spent in
total in all the years of the program until 2015 (which would be a considerable $2.7 billion per
year), over 90% of these funds were used for the purpose of improving housing conditions. In
addition to the assistance being a non-cash deposit, the latter fact is another reason why it
is plausible to think of becoming eligible for the assistance as of an increase in wealth, rather
than increase in income: in most of the cases the money is converted into housing, increasing
3until 2015
4These are families who applied for the certificate, not the total number of eligible families. As estimated in
2013, from 2007 until 2013 around 90% of eligible families have actually applied for the certificate.
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households’ housing wealth.
It is worth highlighting that since the amount of the assistance is fixed, it would have dif-
ferent value for households in different regions. To illustrate we picked several random real
estate ads and calculated the share of the price that maternity capital assistance could cover.
In 2017, for a decent 75 m2 apartment in Moscow suburbs the grant would have covered only
7.4% of the price; for an apartment of the similar size in Barnaul - 21% of the price; for a 50
m2 house with a land plot of 1200 m2 in a village in Irkutsk Oblast’ - 54% of the price.
In parallel to the maternity capital assistance, several other fertility-incentivizing measures
came into action. These were related to an increase in various types of benefits: child bene-
fits (in terms of monthly payments5) and maternity leave benefits. Maternity leave in general
cases comprises 140 days, split equally before and after the child’s birth; the amount to which
eligible (employed) women are entitled to is calculated based on average yearly earnings and
is restricted by a maximum value that is updated every year. Figure 8 shows the dynamics of
the real value (in 2001 prices) of the maximum amount of maternity leave benefit: as evident
from the graph, it has been raising gradually since 2005. Child benefits are another type of
Figure 8: Dynamics of maternity leave benefits (real values)
transfer that a woman can receive in addition to the maternity leave, and is paid until the child
reaches 1.5 years of age. Prior to 2007 these benefits were fixed and of a relatively low amount.
However, since 2007 substantial changes were introduced: these benefits were calculated as a
share (40%) of the mother’s salary, with predefined minimum and maximum amounts. The
dynamics of child benefits real values is depicted in Figure 9. Not only has the reform in-
creased maximum amount available, but has also set minimum amounts that differ by birth
order. Other studies argue that these amounts are relatively low and only a small fraction of
employed women have earnings that fall in the range where distinction by birth order plays
a role. However, another novelty of the reform was to introduce these child benefits for non-
employed women, who now became eligible to the minimum amount. Therefore, the benefits
became higher for non-employed and low-paid mothers, and even more so for higher order births.
For our research question these differences are non-negligible. For instance, in 2006 a low-
paid mother would receive a monthly child benefit that would have accounted for about 6.9%
of an average monthly income per person. In 2007 the same woman would have received an
amount that would comprise about 12% of an average monthly per capita income, and about
24% if she gave birth to a second or higher order child. While it could be argued that it is still
5Mothers are also entitled to a lump-sum benefit at birth. This benefit, however, did not exhibit substatial
dynamics at the 2007 cut-off.
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Figure 9: Dynamics of child benefits (real values)
insufficient to stimulate a family to give birth to another child, these differences do play a role
when it comes to current consumption, which is the focus of our analysis, preventing us from
resorting to a difference-in-difference approach which is invalid in the presence of confounding
factors. Table 22 in the Appendix provides evidence of higher expenditures on durable and
non-durable goods by households with two or more kids in the post-reform period. However,
the difference-in-difference specification used does not allow to distinguish various channels: the
pure wealth effect, the impact of increased amounts of child benefits, and the effects related
to direct use of the assistance (e.g. an increase in durable expenditures triggered by moving
to a new apartment purchased with the use of the funds). In the next section we describe the
methodology adopted to capture specifically the wealth shock impact on various consumption
expenditures.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Defining the sample
We conduct the analysis using the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) which
collects data on both individual and household levels, allowing to evaluate household-level
expenditures on various types of goods and services. Selected expenditures are classified into
the following categories:
• Non-durable consumption expenditures (food, convenience goods, clothes);
• Durable consumption expenditures (furniture, cars, home appliances, etc);
• Expenditures on travelling and entertainment;
• Expenditures on medical services.
All expenditures are converted into real values (in 2001 prices). Figures 10-13 in Appendix
depict the dynamics of real expenditures for the selected categories: it is evident that with
the exception of medical goods and services, all other expenditures exhibit a substantial drop
in 2009 with the major financial crisis, and also in 2015 as a result of anti-Russian sanctions
following 2014 Crimea events.
For the purposes of our analysis we compose the final sample so that it satisfies several criteria.
Firstly, for the reasons described in the previous section, we focus on households in the post-
reform period, covering years 2007-2017. Secondly, given that household composition plays a
huge role with respect to expenditure patterns, for the purpose of studying responses to the
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wealth shock, only households with kids are included in the sample to make it more homoge-
neous6. Finally, there is an issue of defining a proper control group. Note that by construction
a household’s eligibility status changes from 0 to 1 with an arrival of a newborn child, so,
there is no control group that would have households that become eligible without a newborn
child appearing in the family. If this issue is ignored, it will not be possible to distinguish the
response of consumption expenditures to a wealth shock from that to arrival of a newborn. As
a consequence, the sample is further restricted to households with newborns. Next, there are
two possibilities for control groups: households with a first newborn child, and households with
a second order newborn, which, however, are not eligible for the assistance (extended families,
remarried, etc). Regarding the first group, the main disadvantage is that such households have
different demographic characteristics which may result in different preferences over goods, and
also less experience in managing related expenditures. This latter feature implies that house-
holds with an experienced mother, for whom the newborn child is of second or higher order, are
likely to increase their consumption expenditures of non-durable goods by a lower amount than
their less experienced counterparts. The second control group could partially alleviate these
concerns: extended families are likely to have some stock of semi-durable goods (e.g. child
clothing), or have another mother with a child present, who could share her experience in man-
aging expenditures with the mother who has just given birth. A serious disadvantage is that
this second control group is low in numbers and may also differ from eligibles in demographic
and socio-economic dimensions. Table 13 provides summary statistics by subsamples: for the
treated (eligible) households and the two control groups. Indeed, as was suspected, neither of
the control groups is a perfect match for the treated: the first group has less family members,
more educated household head and higher income, while the second one - more family members,
less educated and older household head. Some of this differences may be spurious and result
from a small sample size, but in any case it is important to keep those differences in mind when
interpreting the findings.
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for treated and control groups
Eligible Control 1 Control 2
Observations 395 425 57
Number of family mmbers 4.4 3.8 5.8
HH head age 34.5 34.2 40.2
HH head emp 0.85 0.83 0.74
HH head is female 0.07 0.09 0.16
HH head educ 0.25 0.32 0.12
Income per person 2641 3413 2443
Tenant 0.10 0.15 0.05
Urban 0.66 0.76 0.53
Highlited are characteristics that are significantly different for control
groups at 5% level.
6In addition, the sample is restricted to consist of households that have not moved houses when their eligibility
status switched from 0 to 1.
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4.2 Empirical specification
Following Banks et al. (2012) and Bottazzi et al. (2017), we consider a first-differenced equation:
∆Ckit = α






where Ckit is expenditure on category k by household i in year t; Xit is a set of controls: demo-
graphic composition of the household (number of children and adults in different age groups),
real household income, characteristics of the household head (age, sex, education, employment
status), and regional macroeconomic variables (unemployment rate and average real wage);
Eligit is eligibility indicator, which is equal to 1 if there is a mother of at least two siblings
and at least one of them was born in 2007 or later, and 0 otherwise7; δkt are year fixed ef-
fects. The coefficients of interest are β - households average response in terms of consumption
expenditures to having become eligible to the assistance. Taking the equation in differences
allows controlling for the household fixed effect: it is plausible to think that when the policy
was announced households have consequently updated their tastes for children, which since
then stayed time-invariant as no other substantial policy changes were in place; therefore, the
β coefficient has also a causal interpretation8.
In the following section we present results of esimating the first-differenced equations, using
the two different control groups defined above, as well as a mixed control group (combining the
two).
5 Results
5.1 Responses to the wealth shock
Tables 14, 15 and 16 contain the results of estimating equation (8) for the four categories of
consumption expenditures using the first, second and mixed control groups respectively.
From Table 14 it appears that households which become eligible increase their non-durable
consumption by a lower amount than their counterparts with the first-order newborn: this
may reflect the learning effect and the semidurables stock availability described in the previous
section9. As regards expenditures on durable goods, eligible households increase these more
than non-eligible ones; however, this may be a result of another child present in the household:
for instance, if the second child is entering pre-school or primary school in the same year, it
will be associated with increased spending on related goods10. Table 15 contains estimation
results for the second control group, which has higher number of kids and may partly mitigate
the learning effect that is at play for the first control group, but is low in numbers. Contrary
to what should be expected in accordance with the theory, households that have experienced a
wealth shock do not increase their current consumption more than their untreated counterparts:
the coefficient of elig variable is insignificant for all the expenditure categories. While it could
7Since there is no data on actual program uptake, the only feasible way to proceed is to use meeting the eligibility
criteria indicator.
8Assumig that the control groups are properly defined.
9This result is driven by expenditures on child clothing: as opposed to households with the first-order newborn,
eligible households do not have to spend as much on child clothing for the newborn if they have usable clothing
items left from the first child.
10We find evidence in support of this hypothesis by taking a step back and running the estimation on different con-
stituents of durable expenditures category. The results suggest that the main drivers of larger durable consumption
increase for eligible families are expenditures on home appliances, books and sports equipment.
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Table 14: Control group 1: 1st order newborn
D.nondur D.durables D.trav D.medical
b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig -683.7* 1303** 5.60 29.4
(382.9) (534.4) (57.6) (34.4)
D.income 0.18*** 0.07 0.02*** 0.006*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.005) (0.003)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 2507* -177.4 -303.9* 12.7
(1336) (1493) (165.8) (97.6)
Obs 595 722 750 746
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 15: Control group 2: 2nd child, noneligibles
D.nondur D.durables D.trav_ent D.medical
b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig -789.7 866.2 70.6 28.0
(799.8) (1198) (106.8) (71.7)
D.income 0.19*** 0.06 0.022*** 0.004
(0.05) (0.07) (0.007) (0.005)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 3433** -2637 -429.7* 184.4
(1731) (2180) (254.6) (134.6)
Obs 341 406 420 414
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
be a problem of the low number of observations, combining two control groups and estimating
the equation adding the indicator of having two or more kids in the household (2+kids) yields
the same results (Table 16).
There are several possible explanations to the observed null response of current expenditure
to the wealth shock. First, eligible households may have higher level of indebtedness (since
they are typically at a further life cycle stage than households with one child, for instance),
which will force them to allocate a more considerable share of the budget to debt repayment,
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Table 16: Mixed control group
D.nondur D.durables D.trav_ent D.medical
b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig -1188 1283 73.8 38.8
(771.3) (949.1) (98.4) (68.2)
D.2+kids 612.1 -29.1 -83.4 -4.81
(758.5) (932.4) (95.7) (68.2)
D.income 0.19*** 0.08 0.022*** 0.005
(0.03) (0.05) (0.005) (0.003)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 2486** -707.1 -341.8* 37.7
(1252) (1400) (159.5) (93.2)
Obs 642 776 803 799
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
sacrificing current consumption. To see whether this is the case, we perform a check regressing
the indicator of having taken a loan in the past 12 months and in the past 3 months on the
same set of variables; according to the results, there is no evidence that households which
became eligible are more likely to have borrowed than their counterparts (see Table 23 in
the Appendix). Another explanation could be that the change in consumption expenditures
happens not when the family obtains the certificate which formalizes their eligibility status,
but when the eligibility-granting child is conceived or even sooner. This hypothesis is tested
by using the first and second order leads of eligibility indicator in equation 8. The results are
presented in Table 24 in the Appendix and indicate that a positive response of consumption
expenditures to positive changes in future wealth is not present. However, one may extend
this reasoning by claiming that since all households are informed about the existence of the
policy, the future changes in wealth are anticipated, and according to the permanent income
hypothesis, rational consumers should not respond to anticipated changes in wealth. However,
in the presence of credit market imperfections, liquidity constraints and precautionary savings
there is still room for excess sensitivity. To test this theoretical prediction, we now make
a distinction between homeowners and tenants. The latter are characterized by low levels of
wealth and are presumably more liquidity constrained, since they do not have an option for using
real estate as a collateral. Moreover, those would be the households whom we would expect to
be more sensitive to becoming eligible for maternity capital assistance, since for them it would
be the most valuable. In contrast, households that are satisfied with their living conditions
may not intend to convert the assistance into housing value and postpone the decision on how
to spend it to the future. Therefore, we add the tenant indicator and its interaction with the
elig dummy variable to the baseline specification, obtaining the following equation:
∆Ckit = α
k + βk0 ∆Eligit + β
k
1 tenantit + β
k
2 ∆Eligit × tenantit + γk∆Xit + δkt + εkit (9)
Table 17 contains results of estimating equation (9) for non-durable and durable consump-
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tion categories. While eligible households in general increase their non-durable consumption by
Table 17: Homeowners vs tenants
D.nondur D.nondur D.nondur D.durables D.durables D.durables
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig -1136 -1143 -1366* 1069 1067 818.5
(758.7) (761.2) (769.9) (956.5) (957.5) (978.2)
tenant -375.9 -1376** -185.2 -1213
(568.1) (751.6) (711.3) (865.5)
elig × tenant 2395** 2575
(1082) (1776)
D.2+kids 541.2 534.0 466.4 269.6 263.7 220.2
(737.0) (738.8) (740.5) (948.2) (949.8) (950.5)
D.income 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.08* 0.08* 0.09*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 2480** 2549** 2647** -666.9 -622.6 -507.3
(1253) (1257) (1263) (1397) (1418) (1411)
Obs 643 643 643 777 777 777
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
lower amount as compared to non-eligibles, eligible tenants increase their non-durable consump-
tion more than other households (the interaction coefficients are jointly significant at the 10%
significance level), which is in line with theoretical predictions. Therefore, we conclude that the
null average response of becoming eligible to the assistance conceals important heterogeneities
among households across the liquidity constraints dimension: more constrained households
which value the assistance more are found to exhibit higher levels of current expenditure in
response to the wealth shock. This result is in line with those from other empirical studies
(Cooper (2013), Aladangady (2017)), which find that the increase in spending in response to
an increase in housing value is driven by borrowing constrained households.
5.2 Consumption smoothing
In this subsection we check another theoretical prediction, which suggests that consumers tend
to exhibit smoothing behaviour to balance their consumption trajectory by consuming from
wealth. We exploit partial liquification periods in 2009, 2010 and 2015, which allowed to with-
draw a small amount of the assistance in cash form, and add corresponding dummy variables
to the basic specification:
∆Ckit = α












where Elig09, Elig10 and Elig15 are dummy variables equal to 1 when a household is eligible
in the corresponding year (in other words, interaction terms of eligibility indicator and year
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Table 18: Consuming from wealth
HHs with kids HHs with 2 and more kids
D.nondur D.durables D.food D.nondur D.durables D.food
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig -84.7 -68.1 -65.7** 7.20 -325.4* -91.0**
(98.5) (125.3) (31.0) (138.7) (184.8) (43.9)
elig09 -46.9 1807** 14.8 -68.8 2587*** 232.2
(456.4) (719.6) (134.1) (548.1) (839.8) (170.3)
elig10 -376.4 -750.0 -77.8 -216.6 -717.9 -71.3
(376.3) (511.2) (150.2) (526.3) (630.4) (184.0)
elig15 161.2 -422.6 226.3** -272.3 8.03 316.3*
(276.2) (356.8) (87.8) (517.3) (621.5) (172.3)
2+kids 151.0** 195.2** 2.48
(76.2) (94.2) (22.5)
D.income 0.155*** 0.132*** 0.037*** 0.162*** 0.121*** 0.041***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.017) (0.022) (0.005)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 298.799 -298.965 51.060 446.013 163.513 -42.516
(201.893) (269.188) (64.981) (418.988) (508.124) (136.706)
Obs 15305 19090 17960 5247 6617 6202
Nclust 4396 4942 4736 1713 1981 1862
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
dummies). Table 18 contains estimation results for equation (10) for durable, non-durable,
and expenditures on food in the 2007-2017 period for two subsamples: households with kids
and households with two or more kids. In parallel with the previous estimation of the wealth
shock response, these correspond to using two control groups: a mixed control group (ineligible
households with both only one child and several children), and control group 2 (ineligible
households with two or more kids) respectively. As evident from the table, households tend
to behave as consumption smoothers, in line with theoretical predictions. Specifically, in 2009
the assistance allowed eligible households to have significantly higher expenditures on durable
goods than other households (note a drastic dip of average expenditures on durable goods in
2009: Figure 11 in the Appendix). Despite the fact that we do not find smoothing behaviour
for the aggregate non-durable category, it appears that in 2015 eligible households spent more
specifically on food as compared to non-eligible households. The null result for 2010 for all
categories could arise from the fact that households rushed to withdraw cash as soon as the
temporary liquification period from January 2009 until March 2011 was announced.
5.3 Housing wealth and liquidity constraints
Finally, we investigate whether and how being eligible for the assistance translates into hous-
ing wealth. As a first approximation, from column (1) of Table 19 it is evident that eligible
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households have higher housing value than other households, but this can be explained by the
number of eligible households increasing with time.
Table 19: Housing wealth in the post-reform period
(1) (2) (3) (4)















age3+ × post2010 0.46***
(0.15)
income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant -4.02*** -4.06*** -4.06*** -3.96***
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Obs 52620 50622 50622 53147
Nclust 12334 12220 12220 12441
To make columns (2) and (3) more comparable, non-eligible households
with two and more kids in post-2007 period are excluded from the sam-
ple. Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Therefore, as a second approximation, a difference-in-difference equation 11 is estimated on the
sample covering the time span from 2001 to 2017:
Hit = α+ β12
+kids+ β2post_reform+ β32+kids× post_reform+ γXit + δt + εit (11)
Here Hit is self-reported housing wealth in 100.000 rubles in real terms, 2+kids is an indicator
equal to 1 if there are two or more children in the household, postreform is a variable equal
to 1 if an observation belongs to the post-reform period, 2+kids × post_reform is their in-
teraction, and Xit is the usual set of controls. Column (2) reports the results of estimating
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equation 11 with the original post-reform cut-off (2007). We see, however, that the coefficient
of the interaction term is positive but not statistically significant. This may already suggest
that translation of eligibility to housing wealth does not happen immediately. We then run the
same equation setting the post-reform cut-off at 2010: this is the year when the first eligibles
could get the full access to the assistance (eligibility-granting child born in 2007 would reach
three years of age in 2010). In this specification the coefficient is positive and significant at
the 10% level. Although this indicates that housing wealth of households with two and more
kids improved in the post-reform period, it appears that households prefer to wait until the
assistance can be used to purchase their own housing without taking a loan.
To test this hypothesis the following equation is estimated:
Hit = α+ β1age3
+ + β2post2010 + β3age3
+ × post2010 + γXit + δt + εit (12)
where age3+ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household has two or more kids with the
second or higher order child of three years of age or older, post2010 is a variable equal to 1 if
an observation belongs to the post-2010 period, and age3+× post2010 is the interaction of the
two. As appears from column (4) of Table 19, there is a positive and statistically significant
relation with eligibility-granting child being three years of age or older and housing wealth.
Table 20: Change in housing wealth depending on the age of the eligibility-granting child
(-2) (-1) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
∆Age_Elig -0.06 0.10 0.15 -0.17 0.06 0.30* -0.17 -0.11 -0.10
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
D.income 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 0.72** 0.73** 0.72** 0.73** 0.72** 0.72** 0.72** 0.72** 0.72**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Obs 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635 4635
Nclust 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111 1111
Estimating equation 13 on the sample of ever-eligible households. The dependent variable is the yearly change
in housing wealth, while every column differs with respect to how ∆Age_Elig is specified: in column (-2) the
variable ∆Age_Elig is equal to 1 if a household will become eligible in 2 years and 0 otherwise; in column (0)
∆Age_Elig is equal to 1 if a newborn is present (eligibility-granting child aged 0); in column (3) ∆Age_Elig
is equal to 1 if eligibility-granting child is three years old, and so on. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
Next, we investigate whether eligible households have a preference for the timing of converting
their eligibility status into housing wealth by estimating an equation of the form:
∆Hit = α+ β0∆Age_Eligit + γ∆Xit + δt + εit, (13)
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where ∆Age_Eligit = I{age of eligibility-granting childit= j}, j = (−2; 6). Therefore, a sepa-
rate regression is run for each value of j from -2 (two years before the eligibility-granting child
was born) to 6 (eligibility-granting child turned six years old). Table 20 contains estimation
results: for most of the cases the coefficient of ∆Age_Elig is insignificant, however, as emerges
from column (3), there is a positive though marginally significant change in housing wealth
when the child turns exactly three years of age. This may suggest not only that the majority
of eligible households prefer to buy their own housing avoiding taking loans, but also that they
are prone to do so as soon as possible.
Finally, we test whether policy changes that occured in 2009, 2010 and 2015 (allowing us-
ing funds immediately to pay out housing loans, allowing using funds not only for purchasing
and mortgage repayment, but also for construction of new housing, and allowing immediate
use of funds as a first installment of housing loans) had a significant impact on housing wealth.
Such modifications could have loosen the liquidity constraints for households with low levels
of wealth, stimulating them to improve their housing conditions right after becoming eligible
instead of waiting three years. To see whether this is the case, the following specification was
estimated:
(14)∆Hit = α+ β0∆Eligit + β1∆Eligit × post2009 + β2∆Eligit × post2010
+ β3∆Eligit × post2015 + γ∆Xit + δt + εit
Table 21: Changes in housing wealth and liquidity constraints












HH demographic Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes





Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Here ∆Eligit × post2009 is a term that equals 1 if a household’s eligibility status has changed
in 2009 or later, ∆Eligit × post2010 equals 1 if eligibility status has changed in 2010 or later,
etc. As appears from Table 21, a change of eligibility status is not immediately followed by an
increase in housing value, independently from the time when this change took place. There-
fore, in the time-span under scrutiny, the households on average were reluctant to opt for an
immediate use of funds via mortgages.
The main conclusion that follows from this set of exercises is that housing wealth typically
increases when the eligibility granting child reaches three years of age, and not earlier. This
is evidence of liquidity constraints present, which force the households to wait until they can
access the funds to purchase their own house without taking a mortgage. We suppose that
these constraints are self-imposed: households can borrow, but are reluctant to do so because
of fear of indebtedness, high levels of uncertainty about future incomes and low level of trust
for financial institutions.
6 Conclusions
This paper aims to study the relationship between positive wealth shocks and consumption
expenditures of the Russian households by exloiting a peculiar pro-natalist policy launched in
2007, which granted mothers of the second and higher order child born after the 1st of January
2007 with a non-cash deposit (maternity capital) worth about $10.000. While the vast major-
ity of the wealth shock literature exploits macroeconomic fluctuations of asset prices to study
the relationship between financial and housing wealth and current consumption, our approach
is substantially different as the wealth shock under consideration is of microeconomic nature.
We argue that although becoming eligible for the assistance is endogenous in a sense that it
results from a household’s choice to have one more child, and hence is also anticipated by the
households, specific institutional characteristics of the Russian environment, such as low levels
of trust in financial and government institutions, create both actual and self-imposed liquid-
ity constraints and also mitigate anticipation to a certain extent. Another difficulty that was
encountered stemmed from the fact that introduction of maternity capital assistance was not
the only reform that came to action in 2007: changes in child benefits with differences by birth
order created a confounding factor which is non-negligible for our main variables of interest. To
overcome this issue, the analysis of consumption expenditures response was conducted using
data from the post-reform period only. In addition to the wealth shock response, the paper
studies whether households exhibit smoothing behaviour and consume from wealth in the pe-
riods of economic downturns, and whether and when they tend to execute their right for the
grant by converting it into housing value.
Our study yielded several findings. First, while on average we do not find an increase in non-
durable consumption expenditures as a response to the positive wealth shock, there is evidence
of such a response for households with particularly low levels of wealth and, as a consequence,
high levels of liquidity constraints (tenants). This may result from the fact that becoming
eligible for the assistance is more valuable for these households than for those who own their
own property: the possibility to improve housing conditions may have even been a driver of
self-selection into the program. Next, we observe that eligible households took the temporary
opportunity to withdraw certain amounts of cash to smooth consumption of food and durable
goods, in particular in the periods of economic downturns of 2009 and 2015. Finally, we find
evidence of liquidity constraints playing a role in the housing market. The major increases in
housing value are observed after the eligibility-granting child reaches three years of age, when
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the assistance becomes available to purchase housing without taking a loan. Despite the fact
that policy changes of 2009 and 2015 were aimed to broaden the possibilities to spend the funds,
allowing to use them also to pay out housing loans without waiting until the eligibility-granting
child reaches three years of age, and to use them as the first installment for the housing loans
respectively, it did not have a significant impact on housing wealth: households which became
eligible in 2009 and later still do not improve their housing conditions in the same year they be-
came eligible. While the measures were meant to stimulate households to resort to mortgages,
the majority of households still prefer to wait until the assistance can be used for purchasing
housing without taking a loan. Given that the banks are willing to issue a line of credit specif-
ically on the maternity capital assistance, we see these liquidity constraints as self-imposed.
Regarding the direction of future research, a question worth investigating is the impact of
the policy on inequality. Wealth inequality in particular is a concern for contemporary Russia:
in 2015, the top 1% of the wealthiest possesed 43% of wealth (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Concern-
ing housing wealth, with the data at hand we find that housing wealth inequality has decreased
in the post-2007 period for all groups of households, and more so for households with two or
more children (see subsection A.4 in the Appendix). While the reform contributed to achieving
a more equal distribution of housing wealth, its prospective impacts on other dimensions of
inequality are unclear. Specifically, it is possible that the reform will fuel the increase of human
capital and income inequality. Given that households with low levels of wealth are often also
ones with low levels of income, their choice to convert all the assistance into housing will not
allow them to invest it in children’s education. Meanwhile, eligible households who do not have
a need to improve housing conditions are free to spend the grant on education. This may result
in the future increase of income inequality, which has already been on rise: the Gini Index
increased from 0.27 in 1985 to 0.45 in 2015 (Novokmet et al., 2018). However, the assessment
of the reform’s impact on various dimensions of inequality requires obtaining data on labour
market outcomes of children whose parents invested the assistance in their higher education.
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A.1 Dynamics of real expenditures, income and housing value
Figure 10: Dynamics of non-durable goods
expenditures (real values)
Figure 11: Dynamics of durable goods
expenditures (real values)
Figure 12: Dynamics of medical
expenditures (real values)
Figure 13: Dynamics of travelling and
entertainment expenditures (real values)
Figure 14: Dynamics of real housing wealth Figure 15: Dynamics of real household income
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A.2 Pro-natalist reforms of 2007 and consumption expenditures
In this section we perform a difference-in-difference estimation to evaluate how the whole pack-
age of pro-natalist reforms which came to action in 2007 has affected consumption expenditures
of households with two and more children - the group that benefited most from the policy. The
following equation
Ckit = α
k + βk1 2
+kids+ βk2post2007 + β
k
3 2
+kids× post2007 + γkXit + δkt + εkit
is estimated on the full sample (all households) and on a subsample comprising only households
with children. As appears from Table 22, households with two and more kids indeed spend
more than in the pre-reform period, in particular on nondurable and durable goods categories.
This holds for both control groups used. While the reform as a whole had a positive impact on
Table 22: Consumption expenditures in the post-reform period
Full sample Households with children
nondur durables trav_ent medical nondur durables trav_ent medical
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
2+kids -1888.01*** -547.50*** -54.30* -20.45** -792.13*** -282.16 117.85*** -9.37
(154.36) (155.10) (28.29) (10.16) (183.28) (179.59) (31.51) (12.19)
post2007 -340.40*** -92.22 -38.14** 36.86*** 110.85 -238.48 -55.18 29.87*
(88.91) (81.23) (15.26) (8.89) (211.89) (193.04) (34.57) (15.86)
2+kids × 1048.74*** 419.97** 39.51 -6.24 565.21*** 605.75*** -53.61 -0.71
post2007 (164.10) (164.93) (30.54) (10.67) (178.03) (187.36) (32.83) (11.87)
income 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.05*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HH demo-
graphic
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 723.44*** 442.72*** 207.57*** -15.16 1788.16*** 1336.51*** 385.89*** -32.15
(140.84) (129.29) (23.77) (12.39) (379.20) (336.95) (59.24) (25.88)
Obs 62477 73400 73819 73455 21717 25012 25293 25378
Nclust 13672 14428 14445 14466 6176 6594 6617 6628
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
consumtion expenditures, the channels of influence are multiple: higher nondurable expenditure
is likely to be a result on the larger amount of cash benefits in the post-reform period, whereas
larger expenditures on durable goods can be driven by both child benefits increase and higher
propensity of (eligible) households to improve their housing conditions, which is accompanied
by purchasing various durable items.
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A.3 Indebtedness and response to future wealth changes
Here we check whether eligible households are more likely to be burdened by higher indebted-
ness, which may be affecting their current consumption expenditures, estimating the following
equation:
Loanit = α+ β∆Eligit + γ∆Xit + δt + εit
on the same sample and control groups described in Section 4. Two dependent variables are
used: a 0-1 indicator of whether a household has taken a loan in the 12 months prior to the
interview, and a similar indicator of having taking a loan in 3 months prior to the interview.
As follows from Table 23, for none of the control groups used there is any difference between
eligible and non-eligible households along this dimension.
Next we investigate whether eligible households react to a future change in wealth: this
Table 23: Loans
Control group 1 Control group 2 Control group 3
Ploan12m Ploan3m Ploan12m Ploan3m Ploan12m Ploan3m
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
elig 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
D.kids2 0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.03)
D.income 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
constant 0.26** 0.13* 0.25 0.24** 0.26** 0.13*
(0.13) (0.07) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) (0.07)
HH demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
composition
HH head’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
characteristics
regional macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 779 779 433 433 835 835
Nclust 729 729 431 431 781 781
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
implies that the response in terms of consumption expenditures occurs prior to the arrival of
the newborn, at the time of conception or sooner. To check if this is the case, the following
equations are estimated:
∆Ckit = α













on the same samples as the baseline equation for all the consumption categories considered.
According to results presented in Table 24, there is no evidence of an increase of consumption
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expenditures by households who are expecting to become eligible in the next one or two years.
Table 24: Consumption expenditures in pre-eligibility periods
D.nondur D.durables D.trav_ent D.medical D.nondur D.durables D.trav_ent D.medical
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Control group 1
eligt+1 -390.49 -1129.14* 12.31 -18.41
(406.38) (660.20) (66.09) (35.17)
eligt+2 422.05 1167.13 -4.77 -8.93
(477.30) (834.72) (74.33) (37.45)
Obs 475 554 574 584 352 415 435 439
Nclust 449 526 542 553 341 403 421 424
Control group 2
eligt+1 284.55 -343.87 124.15 87.06
(982.55) (1552.40) (147.97) (76.45)
eligt+2 1069.03 953.45 -248.85** 113.66
(993.54) (1126.32) (120.82) (103.82)
Obs 282 330 349 351 227 271 293 291
Nclust 281 329 348 350 226 270 292 290
Control group 3
eligt+1 160.48 -1230.86 -39.84 108.37
(880.13) (1380.06) (156.78) (76.42)
D.2+kidst+1 -573.25 155.14 76.63 -127.47
(850.69) (1335.39) (158.47) (77.89)
eligt+2 715.34 70.89 -108.07 47.96
(952.96) (1033.29) (138.67) (95.87)
D.2+kidst+2 -164.08 972.01 63.55 -53.12
(918.28) (979.05) (143.71) (93.55)
Obs 504 592 611 620 379 449 472 475
Nclust 477 561 576 587 366 436 456 458
All regressions include household income in real terms, the set of household demographic composition variables, household
head characteristics, regional marcoeconomic variables and year fixed effects. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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A.4 Housing wealth inequality
In this section we present preliminary evidence of the changes in housing wealth inequality that
could be attributed to the policy effects. Since the vast majority of eligible households that
execute their right for assistance choose to improve housing conditions, it could have affected
the distribution of housing wealth. Figures 16 and 17 depict Lorenz curves for housing wealth
distribution for two groups of households: with two or more children and with the only child
or no kids. As follows from the visual inspection, the distribution of housing wealth among
families with two or more kids is more unequal that among the rest of the households, but
the gap decreased in the post-reform period. Furthermore, figures 18 and 19 provide evidence
that housing wealth distribution became less unequal with time for both subsamples. However,
already from these graphs it is apparent that the decrease in inequality in the post-reform
period was larger for households with two and more kids than for the rest.
Figure 16: Pre-reform Lorenz curves Figure 17: Post-reform Lorenz curves
Figure 18: Pre- and post-reform Lorenz curves (1
child or no kids)
Figure 19: Pre- and post-reform Lorenz curves (2
or more kids)
This is further confirmed in Figure 20, which plots the differences (post-reform − pre-reform)
between Lorenz curve ordinates from figures 18 and 19. Virtually for each value of the popu-
lation percentage the difference in L(p) is larger for households with two and more kids than
65
the rest. This allows to conclude that the policy has contributed to reducing inequality in the
distribution of housing wealth.




Problem Drinking and Depression




The tight link between alcohol abuse and depression has been an object of interest for medical
and social scientists for a very long time. Although problem drinking and depressed state are
highly correlated, establishing causality between these variables is not a trivial task. The aim of
this study is to uncover causal links between alcohol abuse and depression by estimating a struc-
tural model and separately identifying the contributions of state dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity. Using individual-level data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS) for the years 2011-2016, we jointly model depression and problem drinking and estimate
a bivariate dynamic correlated random effects probit model via Maximum Simulated Likelihood,
allowing for correlation of both time-invariant and stochastic components of the error terms. The
results suggest that unobserved individual heterogeneity is not only an important determinant
of both variables of interest but is also correlated among them, which implies that individuals
with high intrinsic proneness to depression are more prone to problem drinking. Additionally,
we find that causal links between the two variables are bidirectional, but the impact of problem
drinking on depression is stronger and larger in magnitude than that of depression on alcohol
abuse, especially for males. However, male problem drinkers turn out be insensitive to price
changes, which urges for alternative policies to be developed to tackle male alcohol abuse and
explains very moderate impacts of doubling alcohol price on the prevalence of depression through
decreasing the share of problem drinkers in the population. The effect of such a price increase
on both alcohol abuse and depression amounts to about 6-6.7% decrease in disability-adjusted
lifeyears in three year time, which corresponds to 65.000 disability-adjusted lifeyears per year on
the country level.
JEL classification: I18, C35, C54.
Keywords: alcohol abuse, depression, public policy, unobserved heterogeneity, maximum simu-
lated likelihood, bivariate probit model.
∗anastasia.arabadzhyan@unibo.it. Ph.D. candidate - Dpt of Economics (DSE), University of Bologna, Piazza
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1 Introduction and motivation
The tight link between substance use and mental health has been an object of interest for medical
and social scientists for a very long time. Consumption of alcohol, tobacco and other substances
does not only exhibit high level of comorbidity with mental disorders, but can lead to addiction
to the substance, so that the patient would be diagnosed with dependence, which is classified as
a mental disorder per se. The discussion on the causal links between substance use and mental
health gave rise to two main streams of thought. According to the self-medication hypothesis
(SMH), psychological distress is a crucial determinant in using, becoming dependent upon, and
relapsing to addictive substances (Khantzian, 1997). The opponents of SMH claim that while
this channel is not irrelevant, investigating the reverse causal link deserves the same, if not more,
attention, since substance misuse often preceeds further deterioration of mental state. As pointed
out by Frances (1997), an alternative explanation would be that individuals with intrinsically
high proneness to mental disorders such as anxiety, depression and psychosis also have high level
of predisposition to substance abuse.
As it becomes evident from the broad literature, mental health plays a huge role in determin-
ing individuals’ educational choices (Cornaglia et al., 2015), labour market outcomes (Chatterji
et al., 2011, Fletcher, 2013, Johar and Truong, 2014), and other variables. Substance use is
also one of those variables of interest. However, most of the studies that investigate the link
between substance use and mental health cannot claim to identify the causal link between the
two phenomena. A notable exception is the work of Mentzakis et al. (2016). Having at dis-
posal a cross-sectional sample of individuals from former-Soviet Union countries, the authors
use alcohol-related advertising as an instrument for excessive alcohol consumption, which allows
them to document a significant impact of drinking on mental health; applying an OLS without
instrumenting for problem drinking leads to an underestimation of the effect.
Mental health problems have been aknowleged as one of the most pressing public health is-
sues in developed countries, with the use of antidepressants rocketing in the richer part of the
world in the past decade1. The prevalence of mental disorders is on rise in developing countries
as well. In fact, possibly due to the lack of an adequate timely treatment, societal losses from
mental illness, and in particular, depressive disorders, are highest in developing and transition
countries. Table 25 provides a ranking of top-10 countries by the years lost to disability or death
due to selected causes that are the focus of this study: depressive disorders and alcohol use dis-
orders.
While among the countries with highest depression burden we do find Australia, the US, and
Portugal, the majority of the list consists of developing countries. A similar picture appears for
alcohol-induced disorders. Two other observations emerge from this evidence. Firstly, 50% of the
top-10 countries most burdened by depression are also among the top-10 suffering from alcohol
use disorders. This is another indication of the tight interconnection between depression and al-
cohol abuse. Secondly, all these countries that enter both rankings are post-Soviet states. Given
their institutional and cultural backgrounds similarity, an investigation of causal links between
alcohol abuse and depression using the data from one of these countries may be valuable from
the point of view of the others’ policy-makers as well.
The aim of this paper is multifold. Broadly speaking, our focus is the interconnection between
1See OECD (2017), p.191.
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Table 25: Top-10 countries by disability-adjusted life years (DALY)
for depressive and alcohol-induced disorders, per 1000 inhabitants.
Depressive disorders Alcohol-induced
1 Ukraine 11.07 1 Russia 12.63
2 Brazil 10.46 2 Estonia 10.31
3 Estonia 10.31 3 El Salvador 9.29
4 Australia 9.83 4 Belarus 8.10
5 Lithuania 9.70 5 Latvia 7.81
6 Belarus 9.51 6 Lithuania 7.54
7 Cuba 9.51 7 Moldova 6.76
8 US 9.50 8 Finland 6.46
9 Russia 9.42 9 Ukraine 5.98
10 Portugal 9.39 10 Mongolia 5.68
Source: WHO (2015). DALY is a measure of overall disease bur-
den, expressed as the number of years lost due to ill-health, dis-
ability or early death.
alcohol abuse2 and one of the dimensions of mental health - depression. First, we wish to study
the formation of depressed state and the choice to abuse alcohol in a non-linear framework,
disentangling state dependence from unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is already a chal-
lenging task with specific data and methodological requirements. However, it can be insightful
from the policy-makers’ point of view: whether a certain state or choice is largely determined by
its past value or by individuals’ intrinsic heterogeneous characteristics determines the potential
of policies to impact future states or choices by affecting them today. Our second goal is to
establish causal links between depressed state and alcohol abuse. Finally, we conduct a policy
simulation exercise to quantify the potential effects of an increase in alcohol prices.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 locates our study in the exist-
ing literature and highlights main contributions, Section 3 describes theoretical and empirical
frameworks that we build our analysis on. Section 4 introduces the data and discusses the prob-
lem drinking indicators used in the analysis, the results of which are presented in Section 5,
followed by robustness analysis and application of a different methodology in sections 6 and 7.
The policy simulation exercise is conducted in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature and contribution
Both alcohol abuse and depression are of interest for economists due to their impacts on a wide
range of relevant socio-economic outcomes. Alcohol abuse may affect individuals’ performance in
the labour market (Böckerman et al., 2017), income (Jayathilaka et al., 2016), lead to family dis-
solution (Ostermann et al., 2005) and unequal gender distribution of household resources (Menon
et al., 2018); parental drinking may affect childrens’ educational attainment (Mangiavacchi and
Piccoli, 2018), decrease parents’ time spent doing child care (Giannelli et al., 2013), and so on.
Similarly, depression can have negative impacts with respect to labour market outcomes (Peng
et al., 2016), engagement into criminal activities (D. M. Anderson et al., 2015), and parental
depression affects childrens’ health (Dahlen, 2016).
2Throughout the paper the terms "alcohol abuse" and "problem drinking" will be used as synonyms.
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The issue of separating the inputs of true state dependence and individual heterogeneity has
also received much attention from the scholars; in health economics, one of the first applications
can be found in a series of papers by Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004b), Contoyannis and
Jones (2004), Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004a). With respect to mental health and sub-
stance use existing studies tend to focus on either of the issues. For example, Christelis and
Sanz-de-Galdeano (2011) jointly model the decision to smoke and the intensity of smoking, using
panel data for ten European countries. They find that even after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity, smoking habits tend to be very persistent, however, some cross-country differences
in the strength of persistence exist. Gilleskie and Strumpf (2005) study a similar question but
focusing on US adolescents and also incorporate prices into the analysis. According to their find-
ings, price increases can influence future behaviour by reducing the current number of smokers.
With respect to alcohol consumption, Browning and Collado (2007) use household-level data to
estimate demand systems and account for both state dependence and unobserved heterogene-
ity and provide evidence of alcohol being a habit-forming good. Among the studies that use
individual-level data, Deza (2015) investigates the stepping-stone effects between alcohol, mari-
juana and hard drugs use among US youth and finds that these effects are indeed present, and
state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity are important determinants of drugs and alcohol
consumption patterns. A study very closely related to ours would be that of Fergusson et al.
(2009), where the authors study causal links between alcohol abuse and dependence and major
depressive disorder amoung young New Zealanders via a structural model and conclude that the
causal link goes from alcohol to depression, and not vice versa.
Concerning related literature on depression, Contoyannis and Li (2017) use a depression in-
dex as an outcome variable and study persistence of adolescent depression in a quantile fixed
effects framework. They find that the main driver of youth depression in US is unobserved het-
erogeneity, while true state dependence is relatively low. In contrast, Roy and Schurer (2013)
find evidence of substantial persistence in depression, although in a different setting (Australian
general population) and applying the system GMM methodology. While some studies attempt
to model health outcomes and substance use simultaneously, they do not account for either state
dependence (Yen et al., 2010), or unobserved heterogeneity (Blaylock and Blisard, 1992).
Our work contributes to the current literature by modelling alcohol abuse and depression jointly,
allowing for several ways that these variables may be interconnected. This enables us not only
to separate true state dependence and individual heterogeneity but also to uncover bidirectional
causal links between alcohol abuse and depression, which are overlooked by existing literature
(this distinguishes our approach from that of Mentzakis et al. (2016), who resort to a reduced
form model, and so are only able to capture the immediate impact of problem drinking on mental
health, but not the reverse). Differently from Fergusson et al. (2009), who develop a structural
model in a linear framework, we work within a non-linear world given that the depression indi-
cator available in the data is binary: Fergusson et al. (2009) employ a small sample of young
New Zealanders below age 25 with very detailed measures of alcohol-induced disorder and major
depression, whereas our study is based on the general population survey with very limited op-
tions for the depression variable. Additionally, we aim to provide estimates of direct and indirect
effects of a policy intervention that increases alcohol prices: the direct effect would imply problem
drinking decreasing in response to price, whereas the indirect effect would quantify a decrease in
the prevalence of depressed state among population achieved through reduction of alcohol abuse.
To reach these goals, we propose a dynamic bivariate probit model with correlated time-invariant
and time-variant idiosyncratic components, therefore jointly modelling alcohol abuse and forma-
tion of depressed state. Our methodology and general setting are similar to those of Humphreys
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et al. (2014), who study the impact of physical exercise on health outcomes, Haan and Myck
(2009), who model the mutual links between non-employment and self-reported health, Hajivas-
siliou and Ioannides (2007), who investigate the interaction between liquidity constraints and the
mode of employment of the household head, and Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2016), where the
methodology is applied to study the impact of financial constraints on firms’ decisions to invest
in R&D.
3 Methodology
3.1 Theoretical background and empirical specification
Alcohol abuse is described via the Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM) framework. Suppose
that at each period of time t an individual maximizes his per-period utility choosing whether
to abuse alcohol or not. Let U∗t denote the utility that an individual obtains from abusing
alcohol at each period t:
U∗t = h(At−1, Dt−1, Zt, η
a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt - deterministic part of utility
+ ξt︸︷︷︸
random component of utility
,
Overall utility can be decomposed into two parts: the deterministic component Vt and a transi-
tory component ξt. The deterministic component is a function of several variables: At−1 - alcohol
abuse choice in the previous period, Dt−1 - the depressed state in the previous period, Zt - demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics, and ηa - the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
component.
Analogously, utility that the individual obtains from not abusing alcohol at each period t is:
Ū∗t = V̄t + ξ̄t.




1, if U∗t > Ū∗t
0, otherwise
Following the literature, we make a normalization assumption and set the deterministic part V̄t
to 0. In this formulation, Vt represents the difference between the mean utility of abusing alcohol
versus not abusing in period t.








Ait = I{U∗it > 0}
with I{.} denoting an indicator function. We then postulate that the persons’ depression pro-
duction function at each period is shaped in the following fashion:
D∗t = f(At−1, Dt−1, Xt, η
d) + ξdt ,
where, similarly to the utility function described above, At−1 and Dt−1 are lagged values of
alcohol abuse choice and the observed depressed state, Xit are relevant demographic and socio-
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economic characteristics (which in principle may differ from those entering the utility function),
ηd - time-invariant individual-specific factors, ξdt - stochastic component. The observed depression
state may take values 0 (not depressed) or 1 (depressed) defined as
Dt =
{
1, if D∗t > 0
0, otherwise










Under this formulation we allow both variables to affect each other: depression state in the
previous period contributes to the individual’s choice whether to abuse alcohol or not in the
following period, and this choice contributes to his next depression state, which, in turn, affects
the subsequent choice, and so on3. Our final target is estimating the parameters of the stochastic
structures determining two discrete endogenous variables, disentangling true state dependence
from unobserved heterogeneity. To do this the variables of interest are allowed to depend on
their lagged value. In the case of alcohol abuse, the lagged value captures the addictiveness of
alcohol, or the strength of the habit, whereas the lagged value of depressed state captures its
very persistent nature.
Given all of the above we arrive at a system of dynamic simultaneous equations model:{
Dit = I{γdDit−1 + δdAit−1 +Xitβd + ηdi + ξdit > 0}
Ait = I{γaAit−1 + δaDit−1 + Zitβa + ηai + ξait > 0}
(15)
To proceed, some further distributional assumptions are necessary. Specifically, the time-invariant
individual component, representing intrinsic individual heterogeneity (the random effect), is as-
sumed to be normally distributed, ηj ∼ (0, σ2
ηj
) with j ∈ (d, a), while idiosyncratic shocks have
a standard normal distribution, ξj ∼ (0, 1), j ∈ (d, a).
At this point a brief discussion on what state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity could
actually represent may be useful. As was mentioned before, the lagged dependent variable is
expressing persistence of depressed state in the first equation, and the impact of habits in the
second one. The random effects, representing individual heterogeneity, are the individual’s intrin-
sic proneness to depression (ηd) and being susceptible to alcohol abuse (ηa). These two features
are very likely to be correlated. For instance, it is plausible that an individual who experienced
abuse in childhood, that formed his vulnerability to depression, was at the same time observing
their parents’ high rates of alcohol consumption, and got acquainted with the substance at an
early age, which formed his tastes that stayed with him for the rest of his life. Failing to account
3At this point a question on whether cross-spillovers should enter in the lagged or contemporaneous form (or
both) may arise. There are several reasons for using their lagged form. First, as shown by Lewbel (2007), adding
both cross-spillovers in the contamporaneous form within a non-linear framework leads to the model’s incoherency
and incompleteness, making identification of the structural parameters impossible. This concern is not present if
only one of the cross-spillovers is represented by its contemporaneous value, but then there is a need to make an
arbitrary assumption on which one of the two it should be, which we prefer to avoid. Finally, some data features
are also suggesting to opt for the lagged cross-spillovers: while alcohol consumption quantitative data refers to the
30 days prior to the interview, the question on depression refers to the past 12 months, which precludes modelling
depression as a function of alcohol abuse in the same period. Due to all of the above we prefer the most rigorous
and prudent approach, allowing for cross-spillovers in dynamic (lagged) fashion only.
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for correlation in time-invariant unobservables may lead to spurious results indicating causality
between the lagged or contemporaneous consumption choices and depression state. Therefore,
we allow these individual heterogeneity terms to be correlated, so that the correlation coefficient
ρη = corr(η
a, ηd) can be estimated. The time-specific shocks are also allowed to be correlated,
with corr(ξait, ξ
d
it) = ρξ. This would describe a situation when an individual is hit by two shocks
that affect both his probability of being depressed and probability of abusing alcohol. For exam-
ple, experiencing an impact of a stressor such as losing a job attributes to being depressed, and
if an individual starts spending the time freed up with other unemployed peers whose pastime
involves excess alcohol consumption out of pure boredom, the individual is more likely to increase
his own consumption of alcohol due to exposure to the peer effect.









ρησηaσηd + ρξ, if s = t
ρησηaσηd , if s 6= t
(16)

















with µη denoting the covariance of the random effects terms ηd and ηa. Because the random
effects error terms are assumed to have a bivariate joint density, the joint probability of the
observed outcomes is:
Pit(η


















with Φ2{.} denoting the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, and hdit and hait rep-
resenting indicators such that for Jit ∈ {Dit, Ait} and j ∈ {d, a}
hjit =
{
1, if Jit = 1
−1, otherwise (19)
Because (17) does not have a closed form solution, Maximum Simulated Likelihood will be applied
to integrate out the random effects error terms, allowing to estimate the bivariate binomial probit
model, specified in system (15).
3.2 Correlated random effects and Initial conditions
Until now it was assumed that the time-invariant effects are random, which implies that by
assumption they are independent from the observable covariates included in the equations. Since
in the current setting this assumption is very likely to be violated, we follow the literature and
adopt a correlated random effects approach (Chamberlain, 1984), parametrizing time-invariant
effects ηj and allowing them to be correlated with regressors Xit and Zit in a time-invariant
manner, so that:
E[ηdi | Xi1, ..., XiT ] = X̄i.θd, (20)
E[ηai | Zi1, ..., ZiT ] = Z̄i.θa (21)
This device introduces time-averaged sample means X̄i. and Z̄i. as additional regressors to the
first and second equations of system (15).
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Under the full stochastic structure assumed here there is no need to instrument for the lagged
dependent variables, as it should be done in a linear framework (typically by resorting to Arellano-
Bond or Blundell-Bond approaches). However, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the
initial conditions. The "initial condition" problem in non-linear dynamic random effects models
arises due to the fact that the starting point of a survey is not the beginning of the stochastic
process: we only observe individuals at several consecutive points in time, and the values of
alcohol abuse and depression documented in the beginning of time span covered by the sample
had already been affected by both time-invariant characteristics of the individual, as well as their
past choices of alcohol abuse and depression states. As shown by Heckman (1981), treating initial
conditions as exogenous when they are not leads to inconsistent estimators.
There are two approaches to dealing with this issue. The first one was proposed in Wooldridge
(2005) and implies modelling the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the
initial value and any exogenous explanatory variables, for instance, for depression random effect
we assumed a density function g(ηdi |Di0, Ai0, Xi;ψ), which in a probit setting is convenient to be
thought of as a normal probability density function. The main advantage of this solution is that
it is easy to implement, since it results in a likelihood function based on the joint distribution of
the observations conditional on the initial period ones. In other words, it is executed by simply
adding the initial values of dependent variables as separate regressors in both equations. Due
to its simplicity, Wooldridge’s approach is very often adopted in the literature; however, there
are two important drawbacks. Firstly, from the technical point of view, it reduces the number
of observations entering the likelihood function, since the initial period values have to enter the
equations as separate regressors. While this is not a big issue in long panels, in our case we
have a panel of a moderate size in the time dimension -six consecutive years, which should be
considered borderline when applying the described procedure. Secondly, there is a conceptual
weakness of the approach. Although it does allow for dependence between the random effect and
the initial value, it assumes the former is conditional on the latter. However, as was mentioned
above, it is reasonable to believe that it should be the opposite: e.g. an individual’s inherited and
time-invariant proneness to be depressed determines the path of Dt∗ that the researcher does not
observe, and therefore, determines the D0 that is the first observed value. This issue is dealt with
in the second approach, which was suggested in Heckman (1981). Unlike in the previous case, it
implies specifying a conditional density for the initial value, given observable and unobservable
charachteristics: f(Di0|ηdi , ηai , Xi;φ). Therefore, a separate equation for the initial period has to
be specified:
Di0 = I{Xi0βd0 + νddηdi + νdaηai + ξdi0 > 0}, (22)
Ai0 = I{Zi0βa0 + νaaηai + νadηdi + ξai0 > 0} (23)
with ν representing the loading parameters of individual heterogeneity terms. Xi0 and Zi0 in-
clude the initial period values of covariates (demographic and socio-economic variables that are
assumed to be strictly exogenous). The main disadvantage of the Heckman approach is that it
is not as easy to implement from the technical point of view, as that of Wooldridge.
In our analysis we are going to resort to Wooldridge’s approach to account for initial condi-
tions, and then contrast the results with those obtained with initial conditions a-la Heckman.
Following Devicienti and Poggi (2011) and Kano (2008), for our bivariate setting we insert the
values of D and A observed in the initial period as additional regressors in both equations, when
estimating the specification with initial conditions a-la Wooldridge. Together with the means
of explanatory variables inserted in line with the correlated random effects approach, the final
74
specification becomes:{
Dit = I{γdDit−1 + δdAit−1 +Xitβd + X̄i.θd +Dio +Aio + ηdi + ξdit > 0}
Ait = I{γaAit−1 + δaDit−1 + Zitβa + Z̄i.θa +Dio +Aio + ηai + ξait > 0}
(24)
4 Data
We are going to use the data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) that is
a series of nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the effects of Russian reforms on
the health and economic welfare of households and individuals in the Russian Federation. The
data is collected on both household and individual level, and alongside with general demographic
and socio-economic characteristics includes detailed monitoring of individuals’ health status and
dietary intake, precise measurement of household-level expenditures and service utilization, and
collection of relevant community-level data, including region-specific prices and community in-
frastructure data.
4.1 Variables of interest
The variables of particular interest for our study are the indicator for depression, which comes
from an answer to a "yes/no" question on whether an individual has been experiencing a de-
pressed state in the past 12 months4, and an indicator, or a range of indicators of alcohol abuse.
In fact, alcohol abuse is not a trivially defined concept, as it may take different forms for differ-
ent individuals, therefore, being a subjective measure to a certain extent. Therefore, assessing
whether an individual is abusing alcohol or not may require measures in several dimensions.
For example, the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) contains a wide range
of questions based on criteria specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, including the amount of alcohol consumed, frequency of drinking, social context, attitudes
towards drinking and its consequences. However, in most longitudinal and even cross-sectional
surveys that are not designed specifically with the purpose of analysing substance use and abuse
the questions related to alcohol consumption are realtively few. For instance, the Health in
Times of Transition (HITT) study, which was designed to collect and analyse health-related data
in CIS countries, uses the CAGE questionnaire (Ewing, 1984), that consists of four questions, to
construct the problem drinking indicator. A possible disadvantage of this approach is that these
questions are mostly subjective5. A more comprehensive yet concise approach is the Alcohol Use
Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) developed by a World Health Organization-sponsored col-
laborative project to determine if a person may be at risk for alcohol abuse problems (Saunders et
al., 1993). The test contains ten questions that comprise those from CAGE but also introduces
questions to determine frequency and typical volume of alcohol intake. Regarding the RLMS
data, it does not offer a ready-to-use problem drinking indicator, but contains an extensive list
of alcohol-related questions: grams of each specific type of alcohol consumed in the last 30 days
(in days when the respondent consumed alcohol), number of days this beverage was consumed
in the last 30 days, frequency of drinking in the last 30 days (a categorical variable). The survey
4With all possible drawbacks of such a measure, this is the only indicator available on a sufficiently long time-
span.
5The CAGE questionnaire contains the following questions: Have you ever felt you needed to Cut down on your
drinking? Have people Annoyed you by criticizing your drinking? Have you ever felt Guilty about drinking? Have
you ever felt you needed a drink first thing in the morning (Eye-opener) to steady your nerves or to get rid of a
hangover?
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also asked the respondents whether they think their alcohol consumption is a source of trouble at
work, causes family issues or health problems, but those questions were only asked in 2008, 2009
and 2012, therefore we will not be able to use them in our analysis. There is, however, a set of
questions on the social context and typical mode of drinking: whether an individual drinks alco-
hol as a guest, at home, in public places, restaurants, while eating or without food. Using these
data and having consulted existing psychological and economic studies which propose various
measures of alcohol abuse, we define several indicators:
1. Binge-drinker. A person is defined as a binge-drinker, if their pure alcohol consumption in the
last month was higher than the 80th percentile for a pool of subjects of the same gender, but
the individual reports to have been drinking rarely : once a week or less, in the past 30 days.
We follow Yakovlev (2018) and calculate the total volume of pure alcohol intake converting
the grams of different types of beverages consumed using the formula: Q(pure alcohol) =
0.4Q(hard drinks) + 0.12Q(dry wine) + 0.15Q(fortified wine) + 0.05(beer). Although the
cutoff may seem arbitrary, using a relative measure allows to define individuals who drink
"too much", given cultural peculiarities and genetic traits, specific for the given subject
pool (this is the reason why different countries have different definitions of riskless drinking
(IARD, 2018)). The relative measure allows to evaluate if an individual drinks "too much"
as compared to all other individuals of the same gender (socially acceptable drinking habits
differ drastically for males and females).
2. Heavy-drinker. A person is defined as a heavy drinker if, like in the previous case, their
monthly alcohol intake is in the upper quintile but they report to have been drinking fre-
quently : more often than once a week in the past 30 days. This type of indicator will capture
not those who may drink a lot occasionally, but those who do so often, and are therefore
likely to suffer from alcohol dependence.
3. Frequent-drinker. We define a person as a frequent drinker if they report having consumed
alcohol more then once a week during the past month. This measure has an advantage of
being less affected by shocks that create noise in the binge-drinker indicator (e.g. a "special
occasion" when an individual consumed a very high amount of alcohol, which is not their
typical level of consumption).
4. No-food drinker. Those individuals who reported having consumed some alcohol in the past
month are asked several questions about the mode of drinking. Although there is no question
on whether an individual tends to drink alone or with others, there is an indicator of whether
an individual consumes alcohol without food.
5. Composite problem-drinking indicator. Based on the univariate analysis conducted using the
abovementioned indicators, we combine those that proved to be most related to depression
(heavy drinking and drinking without food) and calculate score as a sum of individual
problem-drinking indicators:
score = I{Top20%aper_occasion = 1}a+ aI{frequent_dr = 1}a+ aI{alcnofood = 1},
and then define a problem drinker with a binary variable problem_dr such that:
problem_dr =
{
1, if score > 2
0, otherwise
Both depression indicator and alcohol abuse are therefore represented by binary variables. While
detailed data for alcohol use is mostly available for every wave of the survey, the depression
variable appears only in selected waves: for the years 2003-2004 and 2011-2016. Given that our




The full sample6 contains data on roughly 6300 adult individuals over 6 years, resulting in more
than 31000 individual-year observations (the first period is lost due to inclusion of lags). Table 26
provides basic descriptive statistics and definitions of the variables used. The average prevalence
of depressed state in the general population is 11%7, frequent drinkers comprise about 7% of
the sample, while roughly 10% report consumping alcohol without food. By definition that we
adopted, binge-drinkers are the top quintile of the gender-specific alcohol intake distribution, who
drink rarely: those comprise 15% of the sample. This could be viewed as evidence of Russians
being typical "northern style" drinkers: consuming large amounts of alcohol on a single occasion.
Heavy drinkers, whom we defined as those whose drinking style may signal alcohol dependence,
comprise about 6% of the sample.
Table 26: Summary statistics (2011-2016)
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
depr12m Depressed in the past 12 month 31,600 0.11 0.32 0 1
per_occasion Pure alcohol intake on a single occasion (grams) 31,600 44.59 77.36 0 1700
avg_daily Pure alcohol intake per day (grams) 31,600 5.08 16.55 0 1002
binge Binge-drinker indicator 31,564 0.15 0.36 0 1
heavy Heavy-drinker indicator 31,564 0.06 0.23 0 1
frequent_dr Frequent-drinker indicator 31,564 0.07 0.26 0 1
alcnofood If consumes alcohol without food 31,551 0.1 0.3 0 1
age Age 31,600 48.75 16.52 18 102
kidssmall If has kids younger than 18 y/o 31,600 0.35 0.48 0 1
city If lives in a city 31,600 0.61 0.49 0 1
married If married 31,600 0.58 0.49 0 1
college If has a college degree 31,600 0.26 0.44 0 1
female If female 31,600 0.6 0.49 0 1
curwrk If is currently working 31,600 0.56 0.5 0 1
muslim If muslim 31,600 0.06 0.24 0 1
smokes If smokes 31,600 0.29 0.45 0 1
lowincome If household income is lower than that of 31,600 0.41 0.5 0 1
40% of HHs within sampling unit and year
Regarding persistence of the main variables of interest and crude transition probabilities from
problem drinking to depression and vice versa, it emerges from Table 41 in Appendix that all
variables are quite persistent, with probabilities of 1-1 transitions ranging from 32 to 48% for
different alcohol-abuse measures and 44% for depression variable. Concerning cross-transitions,
the probabilities of being depressed in period t are slightly higher if alcohol abuse was observed
in t − 1, with the difference being almost negligible for the binge and freq_dr measures, but
reaching more than 2 pp. if alcohol-without-food consumption and a composite measure are used
as a problem-drinking indicator. In the case of depression-alcohol transitions, the picture is more
obscure: for some measures (heavy and frequent drinkers) the difference is negligible and even
reverse: the probability of being a heavy or frequent drinker is marginally higher if in the previous
period depression was not observed. On the other hand, again for no-food drinkers and problem
drinkers, conditional on having observed depression in the previous period, the probability of
alcohol abuse in subsequent period is higher. This may be suggestive of the asymmetric nature
6Using a fully balanced sample may lead to erroneous conclusions if attrition is related to the outcome variables.
Subsection A.4 of the Appendix provides evidence that the results obtained are likely to be understating the true
effects, thus being a prudent estimate.
7This figure is in line with the Russian Ministry of Health estimate of depression prevalence in the general
population: about 10.4% for the year 2012.
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of the interrelations between problem-drinking and depression: the spillover from alcohol abuse
to depression appears to be more pronounced than the reverse.
5 Results
5.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis
Before estimating the system of equations (24), we begin with estimating the two equations
separately, as simple dynamic random effect probit models, for the depression variable and for
each of the problem drinking measures. To adopt the correlated random effects aproach the time
means of the variables smokes, lowincome and married are also included among the covariates.
The initial conditions problem is solved in the Wooldridge’s fasion by inserting the initial values
of the dependent variables as separate covariates into both equations. Tables 27, 28, 29 and 30
contain results of the estimations.
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The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for by inserting initial values
of both dependent variables in both equations. In the framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes,
lowincome and married are also included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard




and represents the relevant importance of individual
heterogeneity in explaining total variance of the error term. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
First, we note that all the variables exhibit persistence: own lags are highly significant, and even
the point estimate of depression lag is almost the same, independently of which type of alcohol
abuse variable was included. Secondly, it emerges that different indicators adopted provide dif-
ferent results. Specifically, binge-drinking does not prove to be related to depression in either
direction; being a frequent or heavy drinker affects depression in the next period, but the reverse
does not occur; finally, consuming alcohol without food has proven to have the strongest bidirec-
tional link with depression. These results are very much in line with the analysis of persistence
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The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for by inserting initial values
of both dependent variables in both equations. In the framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes,
lowincome and married are also included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard




and represents the relevant importance of individual
heterogeneity in explaining total variance of the error term. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
discussed above. Finally, the results suggest that individual heterogeneity is indeed important,
with σ2η accounting for about 43% of the total variance of the depression variable and 39-53% of
the alcohol abuse variables.
These findings were used as guidance for construction of the composite problem-drinking indica-
tor, which was described in detail in Section 4. We then estimate both univariate and bivariate
models, now allowing for correlation between both individual heterogeneity and transitory shocks
of the two processes. The outcomes of the estimations are presented in Table 31.
First, as regards univariate analysis, our problem-drinker indicator is in bidirectional relationship
with depression. Moving to bivariate estimation, it is evident that the relationship still holds,
even after correlations between the error terms are also accounted for. Both correlation coeffi-
cients turn out to be significant and positive, indicating that modelling the two processes in the
bivariate framework is a correct choice. In the rest of the paper the remaining analysis is carried
out using this composite problem-drinking measure.
It is important to highlight that while the signs of the structural parameters obtained are in-
dicative of the direction of cross-spillover effects, the values of the parameters are not enough to
elicit anything about the impacts magnitudes. To assess the latter, we move to the next section
and calculate Average Partial Effects (APEs).
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Table 31: Univariate and bivariate estimation with a
composite problem drinking indicator
Univariate Bivariate
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.380∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.106∗
(0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.059)
problem_drt−1 0.105∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.055) (0.046)
depro 1.03∗∗∗ -0.043 0.98∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.057) (0.077) (0.055) (0.072)
problem_dro 0.186∗∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.068) (0.061) (0.064)
Soc.-dem. controls X X X X
CRE controls X X X X
constant -2.104∗∗∗ -2.725∗∗∗ -2.116∗∗∗ -2.591∗∗∗





NT 31085 31085 31085
N 6217 6217 6217
The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for by
inserting initial values of both dependent variables in both equations. In the frame-
work of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and married are also
included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard
deviation of the heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to the estimated corre-
lation parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant heterogeneity components
respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
5.2 Average Partial Effects (APEs)
Following Devicienti and Poggi (2011), we resort to Wooldridge (2005) and firstly calculate
predicted probabilities of being depressed and being a problem drinker keeping lagged dependent
variables at specific values, and then average the predictions across the sample. This becomes
clear when illustrated by an example. When we wish to calculate APE of being depressed in
t − 1; for a simpler (univariate) case, the procedure is the following. In the first step, the
model is estimated and the vector of coefficients β̂1 is obtained. Next, we obtain predicted
probabilities P1 and P0 setting Dt−1 to 1 and to 0 respectively, for the whole population, keeping
all other variables as they are: the linear predictions are corrected for the estimated distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity and inserted into the standard normal cumulative distribution function







where Dt−1 is among xit and equals 1 for i = 1 and 0 for i = 0 for all observations. The difference
between P1 and P0 is the average partial effect of being depressed in the previous period on the
probability of being depressed in the current period, measured in percentage points.
In the bivariate case it is possible to obtain APEs in a similar fashion for individual equations,
but also the APEs on the joint probability of being depressed and being a problem-drinker. In
the latter case we resort to bivariate normal cumulative density function, which includes one
additional parameter: correlation between stochastic shocks. Table 32 contains results of the cal-
culations of APEs for three cases: the univariate case, the bivariate case for individual equations,
and the APE on the joint probability of being depressed and being a problem-drinker. The first
case is interesting not only for comparison with the bivariate model, but also because it allows
for calculation of standard errors of the partial effects via bootstrapping (for the bivariate case
it turned out to be unfeasible due to tremendous computational power needed).








Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. gcjkfgjkjkcukyuckuktcukkkkkkkkkkfffk
As evident from the table, being depressed in the previous period results in about 6 pp. higher
probability of being depressed in the next period. The number is more moderate for the problem-
drinkinig state dependence: the causal effect amounts for about 2 pp. The cross-spillovers are
even less pronounced, and the APE of being a problem drinker in the previous period increases
the joint probability of both being a problem drinker and being depressed by only 0.5 pp. This
suggests that the immediate effects of decreasing the probability of abusing alcohol are very
moderate; however, in the long-run they may be more pronounced.
5.3 Incorporating prices
We now incorporate prices into the analysis in order to see how sensitive problem-drinkers could
be to a tax-raising or any other policy that will result in a price increase for alcohol beverages.
The data provides community-level per-gram prices of different types of alcohol, which we convert
into the price per unit of pure alcohol by using weights:
price = 0.05× pbeer + 0.12× pwine + 0.15× pfwine + 0.4× pspirits
In the second step the prices are transformed into real values by abjusting for the community-level
CPI, which we construct following Yakovlev (2018). The resulting price variable is then inserted
only in the alcohol-abuse equation. Our setting allows us to do it directly without further ad-
justments to resolve the endogeneity problem: given that problem-drinkers are a small fraction
of the population, it is implausible that their choices may affect prices. Table 33 contains results
of the estimation for both univariate and bivariate cases, using a composite problem-drinking
indicator and including price among covariates.
While all the structural parameters remain of the same signs and magnitudes, the price variable
turns out to be significant at the 10% level and negative, as expected. Therefore, although the
relationship with prices is not very strong, it is still present, suggesting that problem-drinkers
are also responsive to price changes.
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Table 33: Univariate and bivariate estimation with a
composite problem drinking indicator, including prices
Univariate Bivariate
problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.122∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.107∗
(0.054) (0.040) (0.059)
problem_drt−1 0.198∗∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.055) (0.046)
depro -0.045 0.98∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.077) (0.055) (0.072)




Soc.-dem. controls X X X
CRE controls X X X








The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are ac-
counted for by inserting initial values of both dependent variables in
both equations. In the framework of the CRE approach, the means of
smokes, lowincome and married are also included in the equations.
ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard deviation of the
heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to the estimated correlation
parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant heterogeneity compo-
nents respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
6 Robustness checks
In this section we report results of various robustness checks. Firstly, a natural curiosity is to
check whether the findings hold for different subpopulations, for instance, if considering sepa-
rately males and females. Men and women have different habits and different drinking abilities,
as well as the attitudes towards male and female alcohol abuse are very different. In fact, even
with regard to depression, gender differences are quite pronounced: as in many traditionalist
countries, in Russia it is considered acceptable to admit being depressed for women but not for
men, since depression is oftentimes considered as evidence of weakness and self-indulgence8 (Ro-
gacheva, 2012).
8In this respect differential misreporting, in particular, underreporting of depression for males and alcohol
abuse for females may take place. Given that the model as already computationally demanding, incorporating
misclassification error may be extremely time consuming, if not infeasible. However, the important thing is that
underreporting implies a downward bias of the state dependence parameter, and is likely to not affect the cross
spillovers (Deza, 2015). Thus, we note that our estimates are prudent and are underestimating the true effects.
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Table 34 provides evidence on the distribution of the average and per-occasion pure alcohol
consumption for males and females.
Table 34: Pure alcohol intake per occasion and average daily intake: percentiles by gender
Males Females
percentile per_occasion avg_daily per_occasion avg_daily per_occasion avg_daily
1% 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 0 0 0 0 0 0
50% 0 0 40 2.66 0 0
75% 60 4 120 10.66 30 1.43
90% 140 13.3 200 26.66 80 5.1
95% 200 24 270 42.66 117.5 8.36
99% 345 66.66 430 105 203 24
Table 35: Bivariate model estimation on subsamples (by gender)
Males Females
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.377∗∗∗ 0.080 0.444∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.074) (0.092) (0.046) (0.079)
problem_drt−1 0.18∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.016 0.129∗
(0.080) (0.059) (0.080) (0.076)
depro 1.226∗∗∗ -0.165 0.893∗∗∗ 0.045
(0.107) (0.125) (0.064) (0.095)
problem_dro 0.168∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 0.162∗ 1.383∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.068) (0.091) (0.104)
Soc.-dem. controls X X X X







The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for
by inserting initial values of both dependent variables in both equations. In the
framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and married
are also included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the
standard deviation of the heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to the esti-
mated correlation parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant heterogeneity
components respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
It is clear that males consume substantially more than females both on average and on a single
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occasion. Apart from the reasons mentioned above, such a drastic gap stems also from difference
in tastes/habits (females are main consumers of wines in Russia, while males traditionally prefer
hard drinks).
Table 35 presents results of the bivariate model estimation for males and females. It emerges that
the finding on the cross-spillover from alcohol abuse to depression is mainly driven by the males
subsample. The reverse causal link, while present in the whole population, appears to be insignif-
icant in the subpopulations considered; this may, however, be attributed to decreased power due
to lower number of observations. Another curious result arises from the obtained correlation co-
efficients. Recall that in the full sample we obtain both positive and significant correlation terms
(see Table 31). First, we note that correlation between unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
seems to be driven by the female subsample; in fact, this link appears to be so strong that it
substantially lowers the importance of the lagged dependent variable in the problem-drinking
equation. Therefore, for females, unobserved heterogeneity seems to be the key factor that ex-
plains not only the observed correlation between alcohol abuse and depression, but in the large
part also the correlation between past and present hazardous drinking style.
Table 36: Excluding potentially endogenous variables
Exog.controls Baseline
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.447∗∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.107∗
(0.039) (0.059) (0.040) (0.059)
problem_drt−1 0.105∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.046) (0.055) (0.046)
depro 1.000∗∗∗ -0.002 0.98∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.055) (0.077) (0.071) (0.072)
problem_dro 0.201∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.064) (0.061) (0.064)
price -0.029∗ -0.031∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Exog. controls X X X X
Endog. controls X X





The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for
by inserting initial values of both dependent variables in both equations. In the
framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and married
are also included in the equations (only smokes for the model omitting potentially
endogenous controls). ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard devi-
ation of the heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to the estimated correlation
parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant heterogeneity components re-
spectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In contrast, for males correlation between stochastic shocks proves to be significant, while that
of time-invariant heterogeneity terms does not. This suggests that males should be the subpop-
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ulation that would benefit most from a policy aimed at decreasing alcohol abuse prevalence.
Another important feature our results should have is robustness to exclusion of potentially en-
dogenous variables. In the list of controls included in the equations, some variables might not be
strictly exogenous, which will invalidate the results (for the full list of assumptions and detailed
explanations see subsection A.1 of the Appendix). A standard way to check whether violation
of strict exogeneity leads to wrong conclusions is to compare results with and without including
problematic variables. Table 36 contains both the baseline outcomes and the ones omitting poten-
tially endogenous variables (married, college, curwrk, lowincome). As evident from the table,
the outcomes remain very similar, therefore, we conclude that results are robust to potential
violation of strict exogeneity assumption.
7 Heckman’s solution to initial conditions problem
A possible explanation to small magnitudes of state dependence and spillover effects could be a
relatively short time dimension of the sample. Inserting the values at the onset of the time span
as separate regressors may result in "overcontrolling" for the initial conditions. Taking this and
the considerations described in Section 3, we extend the analysis and apply Heckman’s approach
to initial conditions by defining a separate equation for each of the two variables at the initial
period, as represented by (22) and (23). This allows using more data, as the 2011 observations
now also enter the likelihood function. Table 37 provides results of estimating bivariate model
via Heckman’s approach, for the baseline case, and controlling for strictly exogenous variables
only.
It appears that the results are qualitatively similar to those of the baseline case, and also robust
to excluding potentially endogenous variables. However, the spillover effect of alcohol abuse on
depression is now estimated with higher precision than that of the opposite direction, indicating
that the link running from problem drinking to depression is more pronounced than the reverse.
In line with this finding are the average partial effects implied by the new model (Table 38): the
causal impact of being depressed in the previous period on the probability of abusing alcohol in
the current period is 0.9 pp., while the reverse spillover effect is estimated to be 1.7 pp. The
results also suggest that being depressed in the previous period leads to the 9.6 pp. higher
probability of being depressed in the current period, while abusing alcohol in the previous period
leads to the 3.8 pp. higher probability of being depressed in the current period. The magnitudes
of state dependence for both variables are larger than in the baseline case (with initial conditions
a-la Wooldridge), which implies these values being equal to 6.8 and 2.9 respectively9 (Table 32).
To understand the drivers of this difference we again run separate analysis dividing the sample
by gender (Table 39). This time prices are also included in the analysis. It appears that the
structural parameters are now estimated with higher precision: both cross-spillovers are now
significant for females at the 5% level, and the coefficient of problem drinking cross-spillover for
males is significant at 1% level. This indicates that the concern about the sample size was indeed
valid, and provides robust evidence of substantial gender differences manifesting themselves in
the relationship between alcohol abuse and depression.
First, we note that for females both cross-spillovers are present, while for males there is evidence
of the causal impact of alcohol abuse on depression, but not the reverse. In order to see how
9While these average partial effects are small in magnitude, one may be concerned whether they could be biased
upwards due to autocorrelation in the error terms which is not accounted for in the current specification. We show
in subsection A.5 of the Appendix that it is not the case.
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Table 37: Bivariate model with Heckman’s initial conditions
Full specification Exog.controls
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.553∗∗∗ 0.097∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.102∗
(0.038) (0.057) (0.039) (0.057)
problem_drt−1 0.116∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.046) (0.052) (0.046)
price -0.035 ∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Exog. controls X X X X
Endog. controls X X







The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted
for by specifying conditional densityies for the initial values (Heckman solution).
In the framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and
married are also included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parame-
ter of the standard deviation of the heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to
the estimated correlation parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant het-
erogeneity components respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 38: APEs of lags and cross-lags (in percentage points)




the effects differ in magnitude across subpopulations, average partial effects were estimated (Ta-
ble 40). While the effect of the lagged depression variable on the current probability of being
depressed is similar for men and women, state dependence for the problem drinking variable is
much more pronounced for males than for females: abusing alcohol in the previous period leads
to the probability of doing so in the current period being 7.2 pp. higher for males and only
1.7 pp. higher for females. This implies, in line with the previous findings, that males are the
subpopulation who would benefit most from a policy tackling problem drinking, as it would be
more effective in decreasing future alcohol abuse than for females, taking into account that cross-
spillovers from alcohol to depression are of the same magnitude for both subpopulations. Finally,
considering prices as a potential tool to which policy-makers may resort to, we find that male
problem drinkers are not price sensitive, whereas their female counterparts are (Table 39). Fur-
ther investigation suggested that this result is driven by the fact that males, unlike females, react
to an increase of alcohol prices by increasing the amount of moonshine consumed (see subsection
A.3 of the Appendix). Therefore, pricing policies would only impact the female subpopulation.
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Table 39: Bivariate model with Heckman’s initial conditions (by gender)
Males Females
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.606∗∗∗ 0.074 0.522∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗
(0.072) (0.090) (0.046) (0.074)
problem_drt−1 0.253∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.060) (0.073) (0.075)
price -0.009 -0.065∗∗
(0.022) (0.026)
Soc.-dem. controls X X X X







The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are accounted for by
specifying conditional densities for initial values (Heckman solution). In the frame-
work of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and married are also
included in the equations. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the standard
deviation of the heterogeneity term; ρη and ρε correspond to the estimated corre-
lation parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant heterogeneity components
respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 40: APEs of lags and cross-lags








* the structural parameter is insignificant.
8 Policy simulation
In this section we present results of a policy simulation excercise that aims to predict how an
increase in prices would change the probability of being depressed through affecting the proba-
bility to be a problem-drinker. Specifically, we consider a case when the price of a pure alcohol
unit twofolds and remains at this level for several periods. Given that average partial effects of
lags and cross-lags were found to be moderate, we expect the effects of the policy to be of small
magnitude, especially for the model with Wooldridge initial conditions. We first execute the
analysis for the full population sample for the baseline case with Wooldridge initial conditions
and for the second case with initial conditions a-la Heckman.
Figures 21 and 22 depict the dynamics of the probability of being depressed (equivalently, the
share of depressed persons in the population) in response to the price increase for these two
cases respectively. As expected, the changes in the probability of being depressed are very small:
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Figure 21: Depression prevalence in response to
an increase in alcohol prices (Wooldridge ICs)
Figure 22: Depression prevalence in response to
an increase in alcohol prices (Heckman ICs)
Figure 23: Share of problem drinkers in response
to an increase in alcohol prices (Wooldridge ICs)
Figure 24: Share of problem drinkers in response
to an increase in alcohol prices (Heckman ICs)
from 10.952% to 10.939% for the first case and from 11.653% to 11.635% for the second case.
These changes in percentage points are equivalent to a decrease in shares of depressed popula-
tion by 0.12% and 0.15% respectively. The implied impacts on problem-drinking are larger: the
probability decreases from 8.153% to 7.279% and from 8.526% to 7.510% for the baseline and
Heckman’s cases respectively, which is equivalent to a decrease in the alcohol abuse prevalence
in the population by 10.72% and 11.91%. The main drop in the share of problem-drinkers is the
direct response to the price change and is observed in the same period when the price increase
takes place, while the role of habit is small, so further decreases are marginal. For the same rea-
son the main decrease in depression prevalence occurs in the period following the price change,
due to a spillover effect, and fades out in the following periods.
We then explore heterogeneity in policy responses by gender, conducting the same analysis for
males and females separately using the models with Heckman’s initial conditions, since they al-
lowed estimating the parameters with higher precision. Figures 25 and 26 depict the probability
responses for males (right axes) and females (left axes). Recall that males were found to be
insensitive to price changes, therefore the dynamics of the probability depicted in the graph for
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males would have a very large confidence interval10, indicating the changes are indistinguishable
from zero.
Figure 25: Depression prevalence in response to
an increase in alcohol prices (by gender)
Figure 26: Share of problem drinkers in
response to an increase in alcohol prices (by
gender)
As evident from the figures, the effects found for the whole population are driven by female
subpopulation. The share of problem-drinkers across females decreases from 4.379% to 3.321%,
which in relative terms corresponds to quite a substantial decrease by 24.16%. The drop in
the probability of being depressed, however, is moderate: from 13.726% to 13.691%, which is
equivalent to about 0.25% decrease in the depression prevalence. Lastly, we try to understand
how effective would a price increase be in affecting depression in the males population, had they
been as price-sensitive as females. An alternative way to think about this experiment is to pre-
dict the effect of another policy that in relative terms is as efficient in decreasing alcohol abuse
among males as prices are in reducing problem drinking among females. Figures 27 and 28 depict
and compare the dynamics of depression and alcohol abuse prevalence among males and females
adding a hypothetical counterfactual scenario, under which some policy managed to instantly
decrease the males’ probability of problem drinking by about 23.65%, from 13.703% to 10.462%.
The results suggest that depression prevalence in males would be more responsive to the same
instant relative decrease of problem drinking prevalence (by 23.65%): a hypothetical effect of
such a policy would be an observed decrease in depression prevalence among males from 7.882%
to 7.773%, which in relative terms amounts for about 1.4%.
Finally, it is important to highlight that although the effects seem to be of small magnitude, they
should not be thought of as negligible, given that they do matter from a country perspective.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that doubling alcohol prices will decrease the amount of
disability-adjusted lifeyears by 6.7-6.9% in three year time, which corresponds to 65.000 disability-
adjusted lifeyears per year on the country level.
10To obtain proper confidence intervals it is necessary to bootstrap the standard errors of the predicted values;
given very large computational costs of obtaining results for a single estimation, it was not possible to calculate
confidence intervals for the predictions.
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Figure 27: Depression prevalence in response to
an increase in alcohol prices (by gender),
adding a counterfactual for males
Figure 28: Share of problem drinkers in
response to an increase in alcohol prices (by
gender), adding a counterfactual for males
9 Conclusions
This paper aims to investigate causal relationship between alcohol abuse and depression using
individual-level data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for the years 2011-2016.
Having analyzed a range of qualitative and quantitative alcohol consumption variables and their
relation with depressed state, we constructed a composite problem-drinking indicator, which
loads on frequent binge drinking and consuming alcohol without food. To account for correlation
between individual heterogeneity and stochastic shocks in the two dynamically interconnected
processes, we adopt a bivariate dynamic correlated random effects probit model, including lags
and cross-lags of our variables of interest, contrasting the results obtained with the Wooldridge
vs Heckman approach to initial conditions problem.
According to the results, which are quite similar independently of the methodology adopted
for the initial conditions, unobserved individual heterogeneity is not only an important determi-
nant of both depression and problem drinking, but is also correlated among them, which implies
that individuals with high intrinsic proneness to depression are more prone to alcohol abuse, in
line with the literature on social epidemiology and psychology. We find evidence of biderectional
causal links between depression and problem drinking in the general population, but the impact
of problem drinking on depression is stronger and larger in magnitude than that of depression
on alcohol abuse. These interrelations are highly heterogeneous across males and females. We
find that dynamic spillover from problem drinking to depression is present in both subpopula-
tions, while the reverse is significant only for females: therefore, we do not find support for the
self-medication hypothesis in the males subsample. In addition, our analysis revealed that while
the causal effect of alcohol abuse on depression is of the similar magnitude for both males and
females, problem drinking state dependence is higher for males. This implies that depression
in the male population should be affected by changes in probability of alcohol abuse more than
that in the female population. However, estimating the model for male and female subpopula-
tion separately reveals that male alcohol abusers are not price sensitive, which can be explained
by the fact that men, as opposed to women, tend to substitute marketed alcohol with moonshine.
Therefore, the outcomes of the policy simulation excersise for the general population, where
we predict the dynamics of the two variables in response to a permanent doubling of alcohol
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prices, are largerly driven by the female subpopulation. According to the results, prevalence
of depression and problem drinking in the general population decrease by 0.12% and 10.7% re-
spectively if Wooldridge’s approach to initial conditions is adopted, and by 0.15% and 11.9%
respectively if that of Heckman is used. If only the female subsample (for which the exercise
is valid) is considered, these effects amount to 0.25% and 24.16% respectively. In a hypotheti-
cal case where some policy manages to achieve the same relative decrease in problem drinking
prevalence among males, a potential decline in depression prevalence in the male subpopulation
would reach 1.4%. While these figures are small in magnitude, we emphasize that, as shown in
Section 6 and in the Appendix, the estimates obtained are the most prudent possible and are
likely to underestimate the true effects. In order to improve on this dimension, we intend to ex-
tend the model such that it would allow for autocorrelated errors and support unbalanced panels.
These results highlight that policy-makers should consider adopting different policies to tackle
alcohol abuse among males and females: while price increases are effective for women, a different
policy should be developed to decrease male alcohol abuse. Given that male problem drinking in
Russia is a severe threat to public and social health and longevity, our results urge for policies
other than taxation and pricing to be adopted. If such a policy package could be developed and
be effective in decreasing alcohol abuse prevalence across males, a more profound reduction in
depression prevalence will also be observed. Lastly, although the effects of alcohol price increase
found in this study might be considered very small, they do matter from a country perspective.
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that doubling alcohol prices will decrease the amount of
disability-adjusted lifeyears due to depressive and alcohol-induced disorders by 6.7-6.9% in three
year time, which corresponds to 65.000 disability-adjusted lifeyears per year on the country level.
91
References
Anderson, D Mark, Resul Cesur, and Erdal Tekin (2015). “Youth depression and future
criminal behavior”. In: Economic Inquiry 53.1, pp. 294–317.
Blaylock, James R and William N Blisard (1992). “Self-evaluated health status and smok-
ing behaviour”. In: Applied Economics 24.4, pp. 429–435.
Böckerman, Petri, Ari Hyytinen, and Terhi Maczulskij (2017). “Alcohol consumption and
long-term labor market outcomes”. In: Health economics 26.3, pp. 275–291.
Browning, Martin and M Dolores Collado (2007). “Habits and heterogeneity in demands:
a panel data analysis”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 22.3, pp. 625–640.
Chamberlain, Gary (1984). “Panel data”. In: Handbook of econometrics 2, pp. 1247–1318.
Chatterji, Pinka, Margarita Alegria, and David Takeuchi (2011). “Psychiatric disor-
ders and labor market outcomes: Evidence from the National Comorbidity Survey-
Replication”. In: Journal of Health Economics 30.5, pp. 858–868.
Christelis, Dimitris and Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano (2011). “Smoking persistence across coun-
tries: a panel data analysis”. In: Journal of health economics 30.5, pp. 1077–1093.
Contoyannis, Paul and Andrew M Jones (2004). “Socio-economic status, health and
lifestyle”. In: Journal of health economics 23.5, pp. 965–995.
Contoyannis, Paul, Andrew M Jones, and Nigel Rice (2004a). “Simulation-based inference
in dynamic panel probit models: an application to health”. In: Empirical Economics
29.1, pp. 49–77.
— (2004b). “The dynamics of health in the British Household Panel Survey”. In: Journal
of Applied Econometrics 19.4, pp. 473–503.
Contoyannis, Paul and Jinhu Li (2017). “The dynamics of adolescent depression: an in-
strumental variable quantile regression with fixed effects approach”. In: Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 180.3, pp. 907–922.
Cornaglia, Francesca, Elena Crivellaro, and Sandra McNally (2015). “Mental health and
education decisions”. In: Labour Economics 33, pp. 1–12.
Dahlen, Heather M (2016). “The impact of maternal depression on child academic and
socioemotional outcomes”. In: Economics of Education Review 52, pp. 77–90.
Devicienti, Francesco and Ambra Poggi (2011). “Poverty and social exclusion: two sides
of the same coin or dynamically interrelated processes?” In: Applied Economics 43.25,
pp. 3549–3571.
Deza, Monica (2015). “Is there a stepping stone effect in drug use? Separating state de-
pendence from unobserved heterogeneity within and between illicit drugs”. In: Journal
of Econometrics 184.1, pp. 193–207.
Ewing, John A (1984). “Detecting alcoholism: the CAGE questionnaire”. In: Jama 252.14,
pp. 1905–1907.
Fergusson, David M, Joseph M Boden, and L John Horwood (2009). “Tests of causal links
between alcohol abuse or dependence and major depression”. In: Archives of general
psychiatry 66.3, pp. 260–266.
Fletcher, Jason (2013). “Adolescent depression and adult labor market outcomes”. In:
Southern Economic Journal 80.1, pp. 26–49.
Frances, Richard J (1997). “The wrath of grapes versus the self-medication hypothesis”.
In: Harvard review of psychiatry 4.5, pp. 287–289.
Giannelli, Gianna Claudia, Lucia Mangiavacchi, and Luca Piccoli (2013). “Do parents
drink their children’s welfare? Intra-household allocation of time between market
92
labour, domestic work and child care in Russia”. In: IZA Journal of Labor & De-
velopment 2.1, p. 13.
Gilleskie, Donna B and Koleman S Strumpf (2005). “The behavioral dynamics of youth
smoking”. In: Journal of Human Resources 40.4, pp. 822–866.
Haan, Peter and Michal Myck (2009). “Dynamics of health and labor market risks”. In:
Journal of Health Economics 28.6, pp. 1116–1125.
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis and Yannis Ioannides (2007). “Unemployment and liquidity con-
straints”. In: Journal of Applied Econometrics 22.3, pp. 479–510.
Hajivassiliou, Vassilis and Frederique Savignac (2016). Financing constraints and a firm’s
decision and ability to innovate: Novel approaches to coherency conditions in dynamic
LDV models. Tech. rep.
Heckman, James J (1981). “The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial
conditions in estimating a discrete time-discrete data stochastic process.” In:
Humphreys, Brad R, Logan McLeod, and Jane E Ruseski (2014). “Physical activity and
health outcomes: evidence from Canada”. In: Health economics 23.1, pp. 33–54.
IARD (2018). Drinking Guidelines: General Population, International Alliance for Re-
sponsible Drinking. [Online; accessed 30-April-2018].
Jayathilaka, Ruwan, Saroja Selvanathan, and Jayatilleke S Bandaralage (2016). “Is there
a link between alcohol consumption and the level of poverty?” In: Applied Economics
48.22, pp. 2054–2063.
Johar, Meliyanni and Jeffrey Truong (2014). “Direct and indirect effect of depression in
adolescence on adult wages”. In: Applied Economics 46.36, pp. 4431–4444.
Kano, Shigeki (2008). “Like husband, like wife: A bivariate dynamic probit analysis of
spousal obesities”. In: Unpublished Paper.
Khantzian, Edward J (1997). “The self-medication hypothesis of substance use disorders: a
reconsideration and recent applications”. In: Harvard review of psychiatry 4.5, pp. 231–
244.
Lewbel, Arthur (2007). “Coherency and completeness of structural models containing a
dummy endogenous variable”. In: International Economic Review 48.4, pp. 1379–1392.
Mangiavacchi, Lucia and Luca Piccoli (2018). “Parental alcohol consumption and adult
children’s educational attainment”. In: Economics & Human Biology 28, pp. 132–145.
Menon, Martina, Federico Perali, and Luca Piccoli (2018). “Collective consumption: An
application to the passive drinking effect”. In: Review of Economics of the Household
16.1, pp. 143–169.
Mentzakis, Emmanouil et al. (2016). “Psychological distress and problem drinking”. In:
Health economics 25.3, pp. 337–356.
OECD (2017). “Health at a Glance 2017”. In: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-2017-en. 17, p. 216.
Ostermann, Jan, Frank A Sloan, and Donald H Taylor (2005). “Heavy alcohol use and
marital dissolution in the USA”. In: Social science & medicine 61.11, pp. 2304–2316.
Peng, Lizhong, Chad D Meyerhoefer, and Samuel H Zuvekas (2016). “The Short-Term
Effect of Depressive Symptoms on Labor Market Outcomes”. In: Health Economics
25.10, pp. 1223–1238.
Rogacheva, T. V. (2012). “The impact of gender peculiarities on health”. In: Siberian
Journal of Psychology 44.
Roy, John and Stefanie Schurer (2013). “Getting stuck in the blues: persistence of mental
health problems in Australia”. In: Health economics 22.9, pp. 1139–1157.
93
Saunders, John B et al. (1993). “Development of the alcohol use disorders identification
test (AUDIT): WHO collaborative project on early detection of persons with harmful
alcohol consumption-II”. In: Addiction 88.6, pp. 791–804.
WHO (2015). “Global Health Estimates 2015: DALYs by cause, age, sex, by country and by
region, 2000-2015.” In:Geneva: World Health Organization; 2016 (http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates/en/index2.html,
accessed 22 April 2018).
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M (2005). “Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dy-
namic, nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity”. In: Journal of
applied econometrics 20.1, pp. 39–54.
Yakovlev, Evgeny (2018). “Demand for Alcohol Consumption in Russia and Its Implication
for Mortality”. In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10.1, pp. 106–49.
Yen, Steven T, W Douglass Shaw, and Yan Yuan (2010). “Cigarette smoking and self-




To obtain consistent estimates, the following assumptions must hold (notation D(.) denotes
"distribution"):
1. The Random Effects assumption: D(ηi|xi) = D(ηi), meaning that the heterogeneity term η
and other covariates must be fully independent. To make this assumption more plausible, we
resort to the Correlated Random Effects framework, which allows η and x to be correlated in
a time-invariant fashion, by assuming a parametric model: E(ηi|xi1, xi2...xiT ) = x̄i., where
x̄i. are the means of time-variant covariates. Therefore, the means of time-variant covariates
enter the list of regressors, and D(ηi|xi) = D(ηi) is relaxed to D(ηi|xi) = D(ηi|x̄i).
2. Strict Exogeneity: D(yit|xi1, ...xiT , ηi) = D(yit|xit, ηi). This implies that xit+h do not react
to unanticipated changes in yit. Is it true for all the covariates that enter the equation?
Most likely, no: abusing alcohol or falling into depressed state may result in subsequent
family dissolution, job loss, decrease of income, etc. However, note that strict exogeneity
is required to hold conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity term η. Given that CRE
formulation applies (see previous point), the link between η and x̄ is allowed. For example,
x̄ could be interpreted as individual’s "taste" for marriage; then the link between proneness
to alcohol abuse and "taste" for marriage is accounted for. Still, it is possible that a shock
in yit will result in a change in xit+s. In order to see if this might affect the results, we run
a robustness check, estimating the model without those variables which are potentially not
strictly exogenous.
3. Dynamic Completeness:D(yit|xit, yit−1, ηi) = D(yit|xit, yit−1, xit−1, yit−2, ..., xi1, yi0, ηi). This
implies that only one lag of yit and only current values of xit are sufficient to capture all the
distributional dynamics. In principle, it is possible that some lagged values of xit are also
meaningful to include in the specification: e.g. a divorce may be a trigger for depression in
the future period. The same logic of CRE partially alleviating this concern applies also for
this point.
4. Conditional Independence: conditional on xit and ηi, yit is independent over time. In other
words, the errors must be serially uncorrelated. This is a strong assumption and becomes
more plausible with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable.
5. Distributional and Normalization assumptions: for identification it is standard to assume
that V̄t = 0, that both time-invariant and stochastic shocks are normally distributed with
mean 0, and the latter with σ = 1.
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A.2 Transition probabilities
Table 41: Stylized facts
Panel A: depression and alcohol abuse persistence
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 1) 44.17
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 0) 7.46
P (Y bingei,t = 1|Y
binge
i,t−1 = 1) 32.55
P (Y bingei,t = 1|Y
binge
i,t−1 = 0) 6.42
P (Y heavyi,t = 1|Y
heavy
i,t−1 = 1) 44.57
P (Y heavyi,t = 1|Y
heavy










i,t−1 = 0) 3.89
P (Y alcnofoodi,t = 1|Y
alcnofood
i,t−1 = 1) 44.76
P (Y alcnofoodi,t = 1|Y
alcnofood










i,t−1 = 0) 5.08
Panel B: Cross-transitions from alcohol abuse to depression
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
binge
i,t−1 = 1) 11.79
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
binge
i,t−1 = 0) 11.4
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
heavy
i,t−1 = 1) 12.16
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
heavy
i,t−1 = 0) 11.39
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
freq_dr
i,t−1 = 1) 11.97
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
freq_dr
i,t−1 = 0) 11.39
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
alcnofood
i,t−1 = 1) 13.57
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
alcnofood
i,t−1 = 0) 11.21
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
problem_dr
i,t−1 = 1) 13.33
P (Y depri,t = 1|Y
problem_dr
i,t−1 = 0) 11.17
Panel C: Cross-transitions from depression to alcohol abuse
P (Y bingei,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 1) 9.83
P (Y bingei,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 0) 8.64
P (Y heavyi,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 1) 5.47
P (Y heavyi,t = 1|Y
depr










i,t−1 = 0) 7.34
P (Y alcnofoodi,t = 1|Y
depr
i,t−1 = 1) 11.54
P (Y alcnofoodi,t = 1|Y
depr










i,t−1 = 0) 8.98
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A.3 Substitution with moonshine
In order to find out why male problem drinkers are not price sensitive, we study the relationship
between moonshine (homemade liquor) consumption and alcohol prices by estimating an equation
of the form:
grams_moonit = αi + βjpricejt + γXit + δt,
separately for male and female subsamples. Here pricejt are real prices for j-th of the three most
common alcohol drinks: vodka, beer, table wine; and the weighted by alcohol content price of
all available alcohol drinks (the price variable used in baseline models). Other variables include:
individual fixed effect (αi), year fixed effect (δt), and socio-demographic controls (Xit). As ap-
pears from Table 42, for male subpopulation moonshine consumption is in positive relationship
with prices for marketed alcohol. Therefore, we conclude that males are willingly substituting
marketed alcohol with homemade alternative. In contrast, it is not the case for female subpop-
ulation. These results provide an explanation for male problem drinkers being price-insensitive,
as opposed to their female counterparts.










Soc.-dem. cont. X X X X
Individual FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Obs 12145 12145 12145 12145










X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
18900 18900 18900 18900
3780 3780 3780 3780
The dependent variable is grams of moonshine typically consumed on a drinking day in the last
30 days prior to the interview. Prices of alcohol beverages are in real terms. The sample used
is the same balanced sample employed in the baseline analysis. Significance levels: * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
A.4 Discussion on attrition
A very important point deserving discussion is the impact of attrition bias on our results. Adopt-
ing a model with initial condition a-la Wooldridge requires a balanced sample; however, it is very
likely that participants who drop out of the sample are more prone to both depression and alco-
hol abuse. To have an idea about how severely attrition could have altered our conclusions, we
conduct a following check: assuming exogenous initial conditions, estimate univariate correlated
random effects probit model for depression and problem drinking on the full sample and the
balanced one.
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Table 43: Univariate estimation with exogenous initial conditions
(full vs balanced sample)
Full Balanced
depr problem_dr depr problem_dr
deprt−1 0.909∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.042) (0.050)
problem_drt−1 0.120∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.037) (0.045) (0.051)
Soc.-dem. controls X X X X
CRE controls X X X X
constant -2.021∗∗∗ -2.725∗∗∗ -2.106∗∗∗ -2.688∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.215) (0.161) (0.215)
σ 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.96
ω 0.28 0.30 0.41 0.47
NT 62820 62820 31085 31085
N 19711 19711 6217 6217
The variables used are described in Table 26. Initial conditions are treated as exoge-
nous. In the framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes, lowincome and
married are also included in the equations. σ stands for the estimated parameter
of the standard deviation of the heterogeneity term; ω is a ratio σ
2
σ2+1 and rep-
resents the relevant correlation parameters of the time-invariant and time-variant
heterogeneity components respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
First, note that results for balanced sample will differ from those obtained in the first two columns
of Table 31 due to a different treatment of initial conditions. Taking initial conditions as ex-
ogenous should lead to an upward bias of state dependence and cross-effects. Therefore, we will
compare the results of correlated random effects probit with exogenous initial conditions obtained
on a full sample versus the balanced one, and assume that the revealed difference will pertain
independently of the model type (univariate, bivariate, with initial conditions a-la Wooldridge
or a-la Heckman).
The estimation output is presented in Table 43. Structural parameters are indeed different
among subsamples, and unobserved heterogeneity accounts for a larger share of variance in the
balanced sample than in the unbalanced one. To obtain a more rigorous evidence, average partial
effects were also calculated. As appears from Table 44, estimated level of state dependence is
about two times higher in the unbalanced sample. The cross-spillover effects, however, are of
similar magnitude. Therefore, our results are likely to understate the true effects, thus being a
prudent estimate.
Table 44: APEs of lags and cross-lags









One of the crucial assumptions outlined in A.1 is conditional independence, implying that errors
must be serially uncorrelated in order to obtain consistent estimates. For the moment we do
not incorporate autocorrelated errors in the bivariate model, but instead do a simple check to
understand whether and to which extent ignoring this issue biases the resulting estimate by
estimating univariate equations in (25), accounting for autocorrelation in the error terms as in
(28):
{
Dit = I{γdDit−1 + δdAit−1 +Xitβd + X̄i.θd + ηdi + ξdit > 0}
Ait = I{γaAit−1 + δaDit−1 + Zitβa + Z̄i.θa + ηai + ξait > 0}
(25)
Di0 = I{Xi0βd0 + νddηdi + ξdi0 > 0}, (26)





it, j = a, d (28)
Table 45 contains estimation results. An alarming sign would be if we found a positive and
significant autocorrelation parameter ρ, as it would lead to an upward bias of the structural
parameters of interest. However, this is not the case. For depression variable the autocorrelation
parameter is negative, which, in fact, suggests that our estimate is biased downwards, whereas
in the problem drinking equation ρ turned out to be insignificant at all conventional significance
levels (z-test p-value = 0.7), and the state dependence parameter now lost significance, which is
another indicator of misspecification. Therefore, we conclude that error terms for alcohol abuse
equation do not exhibit autocorrelation, while negative autocorrelation in the depression equation
suggests that our estimate of state dependence is a prudent one.
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Soc.-dem. controls X X







The variables used are described in Table 2. Initial con-
ditions are accounted for by specifying conditional den-
sities for the initial values (Heckman solution). In the
framework of the CRE approach, the means of smokes,
lowincome and married are also included in the equa-
tions. ση stands for the estimated parameter of the stan-
dard deviation of the heterogeneity term; ρj corresponds
to the estimated AR(1) parameters of the error terms ξ.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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